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Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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CHECHNYA

Corps Commander Rokhlin Comments on Grachev, Conflict

95UM0244A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 5, Feb 95 p 2

[Interview with Lieutenant General Lev Yakovlevich Rokhlin, commander of the northern group in Chechnya, by Natalya Baturina, Grozny-Volgograd; place and date not given: "Corps Commander Rokhlin: 'The Afghan War Was an Outing...'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We were in Grozny at the end of January. When, according to the words of President Yeltsin, it was 10 days since the war had ended... On the night of 30 January, the Dudayev side announced "a night of retribution" over the radio.

The place we were is called the command post of the Operations Directorate of the Northern Group. The Group is commanded by Lieutenant-General Lev Yakovlevich Rokhlin.

He is talked about most of all today. Some have already said that he is sending people to death for the sake of his ambitions. Others call him the new General Yermolov and a Hero of Russia.

[Rokhlin] Here I was recommended for the title of Hero of Russia. I turned it down, and I will turn it down no matter how many times it is recommended. This is a civil war. But in that first civil war, senior officers of the White Army did not receive decorations.

A promotion? Career? Earlier I was also offered prestigious assignments as well, including those associated with a transfer to Moscow. I also refused this. I want to live and serve in Volgograd.

[Baturina] But decorations for soldiers and other officers?

[Rokhlin] As many as possible. The men have earned it.

[Baturina] For what reason and how did this war start?

[Rokhlin] I am not a politician—I am a military man. But the politicians—this is the mafia. At first, they needed Chechnya in order to do business in oil and arms. They watched for several years how Dudayev was arming himself. No one said then how Dudayev was executing his own Chechens on the squares. Now,

they send troops to "disarm the illegal bandit formations." They did not think how this would turn out. I know from Afghanistan that there was not one bandit who gave up power without the use of force.

[Baturina] What do you think of Grachev?

[Rokhlin] A power struggle is going on, and in this struggle Grachev personally does not interest anyone.

[Baturina] You were in Afghanistan, can it be compared with what is occurring in Chechnya?

[Rokhlin] The Afghan war was an outing in comparison with what is happening here.

[Baturina] Speaking of the cruelty of the Dudayevites, do you have in mind the battle for the Council of Ministers building?

[Rokhlin] Not only. I have everything in mind. When we were taking this building, one of our dead or wounded soldiers was hanging in each window. Why are the human rights defenders not talking about this?

[Baturina] Is it true that our prisoners are fighting on Dudayev's side?

[Rokhlin] It is true. But threats are the reason for this, and bribery and something else—I do not know. Sometimes they come out of captivity and work as Dudayev's scouts. There was everything here.

The Dudayev side used the armistice not only to bury those who were killed and to help the wounded, but also to regroup their forces and strike us.

[Baturina] What do you fear?

[Rokhlin] Lies. If the truth is not known, I do not know how we will be able to return to Volgograd. And I do not know whether the people want to know the truth about our army in general and about my corps in particular.

The Dudayev propaganda is working at full power and more effectively than ours. Everyone picks up their words about the fact that in our 8th Guards Corps the losses number dozens of thousands. But here are the official data. As of 30 January, there had been 140 persons killed. Of these, 30 were officers, six were warrant officers, and 104 were soldiers and sergeants. Four hundred and ninety-seven persons were wounded. Soldiers and sergeants—363, warrant officers—11, and officers—123.

I am not hiding anything. I bow low to the mothers, and I ask their forgiveness.

Document Lists Weapons Left in Chechnya in 1992

*95UM0207A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian
12 Jan 95 p 3*

[Article: "An Anonymous Author in the Ministry of Defense Defines the Amount of Military Equipment Given as a 'Present' to Chechnya: The Version Concerning the 50-Percent Dividing of the Equipment Is Dubious"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Shans information agency in St. Petersburg has received from anonymous sources in the RF Ministry of Defense a certain document—a memorandum concerning the quantity and types of arms that were left on the territory of Chr [Chechen Republic] after the last subdivisions of the Russian

Army withdrew from there in 1992. Basically this is property that had been carried on the balance sheet of a Russian motorized rifle division that had been deployed in Grozny. Judging from the memorandum, practically all the T/O&E weapons remained in Chechnya, and that leaves no doubt concerning any 50-percent dividing of the property between the sides. In the opinion of specialists, it was specifically those weapons that enabled the Dudayev regime to put up effective resistance to the oppositional and Russian formations last year. However, that quantity of weapons (especially the ammunition) is obviously insufficient for any large-scale protracted combat actions. Therefore, in order to get a complete picture, it is still necessary to establish the channels that provided additional supplies to the Dudayev formations during 1993-1994.

Russian Army Arms Located on the Territory of the Chechen Republic (As of the End of 1992)

	Units
Armored equipment:	
Tanks, T-62M and T-72	42
BMP-1 and BMP-2	36
BTR-70 and BRDM-2	30
Total:	108
Antitank systems:	
9P148 ("Konkurs")	2
9P138M ("Fagot")	24
9P151 ("Metis")	51
RPG-7 (hand-held grenade launcher)	523
Total:	590
Artillery, mortars, barrage-fire rocket systems:	
82 BM-37 (latest modernization of the "Katyusha")	6
120 PM-38 (mortar)	58
120 M2VII (mortar)	3
57P1Ts ZIS-2 (gun)	3
76DP ZIS (gun)	12
85DP D-4 (howitzer)	3
85P1P D-48 (gun)	9
100 MG-12N (mortar)	6
BM-12 ("Grad")	18
120 G D-30 (howitzer)	30
Total:	158
Small arms:	
AK-74	18,832
OPD (Dragunov rifle with telescopic sight)	533
AGS (automatic grenade-thrower)	138
RP-25 (light machinegun)	346
PLM (Kalashnikov machinegun)	120

Russian Army Arms Located on the Territory of the Chechen Republic (As of the End of 1992) (Continued)

	Units
RPK-74 (light machinegun)	576
SPSh (medium machinegun)	118
AKM (caliber 7.62)	9307
PM, TT (pistols)	10,581
PKT (tank machinegun)	678

Aviation (See Note)**"Kalinovskaya" Air Base:**

L-39 (training)	80
L-29 (training)	30
MiG-17	3
MiG-15	2
An-2	6
Mi-8	2

"Khankala" Air Base:

L-39 (training)	72
L-29 (training)	64

Note: Forty trained pilots are present. Accelerated course for training an additional 100 persons is being carried out. Forty pilots are being instructed in Turkey. L-29 and L-39 are training models of combat aircraft. Flight range—850 km. Altitude (maximum), 11,500 meters. Speed, 810 km/hr. All aircraft have been equipped with devices for carrying 100 kg of aerial bombs or OB-16 cassettes with 32 NURS G-5 in each.

Air defense forces:

"Strela-10" (no combat supplies on hand)	10
"Igla-7" (no combat supplies on hand)	7
ZU-23 (no combat supplies on hand)	6
ZSU-23-4 (combat supplies, 3528 units)	4
S-60 (combat supplies, 2120 units)	6
AZP (no combat supplies on hand)	3
ZPU-4 (no combat supplies on hand)	4

Russian Army Arms Located on the Territory of the Chechen Republic (As of the End of 1992)**Ammunition:**

Antitank guided missiles		740
[Artillery] Rounds		25,000
	122 mm	340
	100 mm	1000
	82 mm	1000
	76 mm	1500
	57 mm	1600
Heavy-caliber rounds (30 mm)		30,000
Grenades		72,000
	RG-42	25,000
	F-1	35 million
Cartridges		0.5 million
	5.45 mm	140,000
	7.62 mm	11 million
	12.7 mm	35 million
	14.5 mm	0.5 million

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Shaposhnikov on War in Chechnya

95UM0215A Moscow OBRONITEL'NAIA GAZETA
in Russian No 2, 12 Jan 95 p 4

[Interview with Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov by Lieutenant Vitaliy Yaroshevskiy (Reserves); place and date not given: "Blitzflop in the Caucasus"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Yaroshevskiy] How is one to assess the actions of the "best defense minister in recent decades"? He promised to resolve all questions in two hours, with a paratroop regiment only, and called the use of tanks in the city the height of unprofessionalism. And then he himself sent these tanks into Groznyy. I, a lieutenant in the reserves, understand well enough what he doomed those guys to. You are a marshal. Tell me, what part of the body were the military chiefs thinking with when they sent a column of tanks into the city?

[Shaposhnikov] I do not know what part of the body, but they evidently thought: We have tanks, several hundred, whereas where Dudayev is, some kind of a scurvy gang has assembled. So now we will move the tanks, and that gang will run away at the very sight of them! That was a monstrous failure in the assessment of the opposite side. Or a crazy desire to complete the task a little sooner. In any case, it is poor training and treachery.

[Yaroshevskiy] It has already been a month that there has been war in Chechnya. The Chechens are fighting desperately. In Groznyy alone, 20,000 people are under arms—two divisions. They are armed with our weapons. How and when could such a thing have happened?

[Shaposhnikov] Let us try to reconstruct the picture. The question of how these weapons found themselves in the hands of the Chechen home guard has its own history and requires normal analysis. This very day I can testify to the fact that when I was defense minister of the USSR, the weapons of our Army were not transferred into other people's hands. More than that, our military subdivisions were on the territory of Chechnya and guarded the military depots.

The chronology of those events looks like this. I first spoke over the telephone with Dzhokhar Dudayev somewhere in the first 10 days of November 1991. I myself called him. He said: Everything is normal; I am busy with presidential affairs, and my people are exulting. Then I said to him: Dzhokhar Musayevich, I ask that your exultant people not swoop down on our depots; otherwise... He answered clearly and crisply, like a military man: Comrade Defense Minister, permit me to assure you that while I am here, not a single hair will fall from the head of a Soviet soldier.

In December of the same year, I sent Comrade Grachev into Chechnya. He served on the staff of a group of generals for the study of the situation on the ground. In accordance with the results of his work, I sent instructions to the troops of the North Caucasus military district, in which headquarters was directed to take a series of additional measures for the protection of the weapons. At the same time, the commander in chief of the land forces was ordered to organize the removal of these weapons. The measures that were taken on location were these: mining of depots and the removal of arms from a state of combat. By that time, Chechen pickets had begun to appear around our garrisons and depots. Therefore, the sentries were given the order in case of attack to fire to kill. Negotiations also continued.

In the beginning of February 1992, Grachev was again present at negotiations in Chechnya. At that time, he was my first deputy. At the end of February, Dudayev announced that he would create his own army, and proposed to split the arms 50-50. I reacted negatively, and said at a meeting at the Defense Ministry that such a formula was not acceptable for us. By that time, there had already been attempts to seize Army weapons in Chechnya.

In the beginning of May 1992, Grachev became minister of defense of Russia, and somewhere from the 20th to the 29th, he sent instructions to the command of the North Caucasus military district, ordering that the weapons be divided between Dudayev and the district. Headquarters began to remove the weapons in the summer, but of 50,000 guns, only one-fifth were removed.

[Yaroshevskiy] Why did you not prevent such a dividing up?

[Shaposhnikov] First of all, I did not know about Grachev's May instructions. Second of all, here is a document from a later time, which influenced the relationship of the military leadership of Russia toward the joint armed forces of the CIS and toward me personally as the commander of the joint armed forces. This is Grachev's report to the president of Russia. The minister of defense proposed to the president to arrange for the exclusion from the agenda of the question of the creation of the joint armed forces at the regular session of the Council of Heads of State of the CIS. In a word, the Russian military leadership did not even consider it possible to inform me of its decision regarding weapons in Chechnya. I will not name names. But it seems to me that if one looks into who divided up the weapons in Chechnya and who has stirred up the trouble there now, the addresses and names would coincide.

[Yaroshevskiy] Tell me, what was today's announcement by Shakhray on your account about?

[Shaposhnikov] Many politicians are beginning to "make themselves" on this war in Chechnya. And, unfortunately, some of them are trying to smear everyone, while they themselves want to remain in white tails. Mr. Shakhray.... What place did he occupy then in the Russian power structures? I do not remember. True, I will note that I did not hear an accusatory intonation in his recent television interview.

[Yaroshevskiy] About the weapons: Besides the 50,000 guns, what else was in Chechnya?

[Shaposhnikov] Tens of tanks, tens of infantry combat vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and trucks.

[Yaroshevskiy] And they managed to remove them, at least in part?

[Shaposhnikov] Not all of them. Some were moved, some were taken out of action, but far from 50 percent.

[Yaroshevskiy] Why, three years ago, were troops taken out of Chechnya? Why do they remain in Tajikistan, on the territory of another state, whereas they were taken out of Chechnya, from Russian territory?

[Shaposhnikov] That can be explained by the inability or lack of desire of the Russian leadership to come to an agreement with Dudayev's regime. I am convinced that today there is nothing so valuable that it is worth destroying our own cities and killing dozens, hundreds, and maybe even thousands of Russian citizens. There is nothing that valuable!

[Yaroshevskiy] Our correspondent brought back from Grozny a handful of little balls and small hammered tacks, which he gathered in Shali on the site of a bomb explosion. I think that such weaponry is forbidden by the Geneva Convention as antihumanitarian.

[Shaposhnikov] That is needle-shaped ammunition; it is used mostly in multiple rocket launchers. Such weaponry really is prohibited in attacks on population points. But I do not have any data on its use in Chechnya.

[Yaroshevskiy] But, judging by everything, it was used. And against the defenders of Grozny as well. Nevertheless, journalists arriving from there unanimously affirm that that city will submit only when it is turned into rubble. Like Stalingrad. The politicians, it seems, do understand such things. But how does our military leadership see this?

[Shaposhnikov] Ask the military leadership.

[Yaroshevskiy] Does it not seem to you that the war in Chechnya was unleashed so that certain spiders in Moscow could devour others?

[Shaposhnikov] I do not think that there was any evil design here. It is possible that the situation in Moscow is a consequence of the events in Chechnya. It is possible that it is the other way around. But both the one and the other are ugly.

[Yaroshevskiy] And the last thing. Your commentary to Deputy Prime Minister Yegorov's statement on your participation in the transferal of arms to Dudayev.

[Shaposhnikov] I think that this information is in the style of "...with one regiment in two hours," "on 5 January we will enter Grozny without a fight...", and so on.

Lt-Gen Mayorov on Situation of Siberian Troops Fighting in Chechnya

954F1137A Novosibirsk VECHERNIY
NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 30 Jan 95 p 4

[Report by Igor Sibirtsev on press conference given by Lieutenant General Mayorov, first deputy commander of the Siberian Military District, at the Novosibirsk Post Officers Club; date not given: "On the Northern Front of Grozny"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The "chopper" with Lieutenant General Aleksandr Mayorov, first deputy commander of the Siberian Military District, and a group of officers on board landed at Grozny's Severnyy Airport. Straight from there they proceeded to the brigade command post, and to battalions and other units where soldiers from the Siberian Military District are fighting.

They are conducting combat operations along the main, most intense sector of the front, in the corps of General Lev Rokhlin. According to comments from Lieutenant-General Kvashin, commanding general of the Russian Group of Forces in Chechnya, from Chief of Staff Shevtsov and other military experts, units of the Siberian Military District are conducting themselves appropriately in the profession of arms and possess adequate training for the conduct of combat operations.

It is with this comment that Lieutenant General Mayorov began the press conference which was conducted at the Novosibirsk Post Officers Club.

The Siberians began active combat operations on 30 December of last year. They greeted the New Year in combat formation. Serving first at combat posts, they then engaged in battle in Grozny itself.

All the same, no matter how well trained the Siberians might be, inner-city combat is a very special category of warfare. Whereas for offensive operations on open terrain, the casualty ratio between offensive and defensive forces is three to one, during street combat it reaches four and sometimes five to one.

As we have already reported, the Siberians participated in taking the buildings of the war college, school, bank, and Council of Ministers. Some 27 officers, sergeants, and soldiers from combat units of the district were awarded orders and medals for their bravery, for their decisive and skillful actions.

It is not only home guardsmen who are fighting against our lads on the other side, but mercenaries as well—and not just "dogs of war" from Turkey, Afghanistan, and the Arab countries, but from the Siberian region as well. Unfortunately, we also encounter members of the Russian populace of Chechnya in Dudayev's gang formations.

Lieutenant General Mayorov provided details. In one day of combat, a mercenary receives \$1,000. Additionally, he receives \$800 for a Russian officer killed, \$600 for a soldier, and \$1,200 for a tank or other combat vehicle knocked out.

Representatives of the three power ministries are involved in the military operations in Chechnya. They are carrying out their own specific missions. Without detracting from the worthy and meritorious service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Federal Counter-intelligence Service, we can state nonetheless that the main burden in the execution of assigned missions lies squarely on the shoulders of the Army. Soldiers of the Russian Army have been fighting in the first echelon. Internal troops have been in the second, engaged in the "clean-up" of liberated areas.

Despite all of this, a paradox is entirely evident—in equipment and other types of support, the Army fares worst. Even the helmets worn by Army soldiers and officers are of the "postwar" variety. A 5.45-caliber bullet "takes" it with very little resistance. While only the internal troops have new helmets of the "hemisphere" variety, with far more effective protective features. Soldiers fighting in the first echelon need these, of course. We absolutely must not take something from one and hand it over to another. However, such "distortions" must be eliminated immediately.

There was also discussion of a matter critically alarming to everyone—our dead and wounded. Lieutenant General Mayorov cited figures. As of the time he arrived in the theater of combat operations, over 200 Siberians had been wounded. Twelve died, five of whom were officers. Then reports came in concerning the deaths of another 23 soldiers.

Right now the Siberian battalions have been withdrawn to the milk production facility in Groznyy for rest.

Chechnya: 17 January Chronicle of Events

*95UM0216A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 17 Jan 95 p 1*

[Report from the Press Service of the Government of the Russian Federation: "Today It Is Very Difficult for Russia's Soldiers. Russians, Support Your Sons! Chechnya: a Chronicle of Events"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

—Dudayev's people used the truce declared by Russia to gather and regroup their forces and for propaganda effects on the people. The peaceful way out of the crisis proposed by the Russian side was explained to the inhabitants of Chechnya by saying that the federal troops "were debilitated and asked for a truce."

—There are increasing conflicts in the immediate circle of people around Dudayev in the search for ideas on how to get out of the situation. Dudayev has practically lost control of the actions of the illegal armed formations. Scattered groups of combatants are resisting the federal troops in Groznyy.

—Operating in Groznyy are mobile groups of 10-15 well-trained combatants armed with grenade launchers, automatic weapons, and night-vision devices. The main regions of their concentration are the northwestern, southern, and southeastern parts of the city, from where they are commanded.

—At the present time, as many as 300 of Dudayev's militia members and combatants are deployed in several population centers around Groznyy. They include about 40 Mujahideen.

—In the present situation, the command of the illegal armed formations is taking measures to regroup and to evacuate the most combat-ready subunits to previously prepared bases in the southern and southeastern regions of Chechnya.

—A concentration of the Dudayev forces and equipment has been noted in Novo-Promyslovskiy Rayon of Groznyy. Thus, bandit formations have redeployed as many as five units of armored equipment to the territory of the former military installation.

—Captured combatants confirm information on the presence in the illegal armed formations of mercenaries from Afghanistan, Latvia, and other states. They include a minimum of 20 women snipers.

—Raiding parties disguised as refugees are striving to leave Chechnya. They have a long-term mission to

- organize cooperation with extremist organizations in the republics of the North Caucasus for the establishment of armed groups.
- Under Dudayev's instructions, a tribute averaging \$2,500 has been imposed on Chechen business people working both in Chechnya and in other regions of Russia.
- A significant part of the population of the mountainous regions of Chechnya supports the combatants only verbally. It has been noted that the local inhabitants oppose the presence of Dudayev's combatants in their settlements, thereby striving to save their villages from destruction and the spread of the war to the mountains.
- The negotiations of the command of the Russian Army and internal forces on the surrender of weapons are having positive results. In some rayons, however, particularly in Shchelkovskiy Rayon, representatives of the administration state that the populace will surrender its weapons only after an order from Dudayev or when the city is captured by Russian troops.
- The soldiers of a composite detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia destroyed three ammunition dumps in the city of Grozny and confiscated a large quantity of weapons.

Chechnya: 19 January Chronicle of Events

95UM0216B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 19 Jan 95 p 1

[Report from the Press Service of the Government of the Russian Federation: "Today It Is Very Difficult for the Soldiers of Russia. Russians, Support Your Sons! Chechnya: a Chronicle of Events"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

—On behalf of President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin, Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation V. Chernomyrdin is continuing to carry out a series of meetings with representatives of different public and political forces of the Chechen Republic.

Meetings were held with M. Tatarkhanov, G. Elmurzayeva, V. Sagayev, V. Khasanov, I. Magomadov, and others—with entrepreneurs and economic leaders, including with deputies of the former Supreme Soviet of Checheno-Ingushetia. Also with Gen. N. Suleymanov, who has actively opposed the Dudayev regime since the spring of 1993 and spent more than 10 months in his torture chambers. There was also a brief conversation with T. Abubakarov and U. Imayev, representatives of D. Dudayev, at their request.

The Chairman of the Government of Russia stressed that a conversation with Dudayev and with his "field commanders" can only be about the cessation of bloodshed, the procedures for the surrender or destruction of weapons, and the termination of the actions of illegal armed formations. D. Dudayev and his entourage have one last chance to prove their desire to renounce a continuation of bloodshed and to demonstrate a real ability to manage the situation: to cease senseless combat operations, to destroy heavy equipment, and to begin the surrender of firearms. Full responsibility for the continuation of the bloodshed and the multiplication of the number of casualties lies with D. Dudayev and his entourage. His envoys did not receive any promises of a personal meeting with V. Chernomyrdin or guarantees for the political future of D. Dudayev.

—The military groups of the Ministry of Defense and of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia are continuing combat operations to capture and control the center of Grozny and to block and destroy illegal armed formations. The intensity of the street battles is gradually diminishing.

—Forces in opposition to the Dudayev regime are not taking part in combat operations. They have taken control of a number of population centers.

—Reports have been received indicating the possible deployment of groups of armed combatants in the mountainous and forest areas of Tuapsinskiy Rayon (Krasnodar Kray), who are equipping bases for a guerrilla war.

Journalist's Notes on Chechnya War

95UM0216C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 Jan 95 p 2

[Article by Mariya Demenyeva, Mikhail Leontyev, and Leonid Kostrov: "A Dirty War Against the Russian Army"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mozdok begins in the mud. A thin sticky layer of it greets you on the runway and it gets deeper as you move toward the military installation located at the airfield. Kneaded by military equipment and thousands of soldiers' boots, the mud on the streets of the installation begins to rise to your ankles.

There is a morgue here in Mozdok. There the castrated remains of Russian soldiers and officers, dismembered by Dudayev's "humanists" and with eyes gouged out and ears cut off await shipment home....

Grozny is 110 km away. There are two ways to get there. You can either go in a convoy from Grozny, which sometimes takes days, or you can fly 45 minutes

by helicopter to Tolstoy-Yurta and from there—still in a convoy—you go by armored vehicle. But the helicopters do not fly often on account of the constant fog.

We were able to join a convoy. We were fortunate, because we got to Tolstoy-Yurta in just six hours. The remaining 22 km took us three hours. This is the most dangerous section. They opened the hatches of the armored personnel carriers: in the event that they run over a mine, there will be less pressure and a chance that not everyone will be cooked on the armor. But if they are attacked with a grenade launcher, there is practically no chance of surviving.

Here, in the northern grouping, they call the road to the front line the "road of life." This is clearly dark humor. Our armored personnel carrier covers the stretch of about 6 km at a speed of 80 km per hour—the drivers have all become aces, for one cannot drive more slowly: Dudayev's men with the grenade launchers are hiding in the buildings.

Here is a region that our forces control. The city hospital. They only associations that come to mind are from films on Stalingrad and, more recently, on Bukovar in the former Yugoslavia. Entire houses have practically disappeared—burned out shells. Ruins. Almost every house here has been taken by inhuman effort and every piece of land is literally soaked in the blood of the Russian Army, paid for in lives. They showed us, for example, a section about a kilometer long that the warriors took six days to take.

Here, behind the backs of peaceful inhabitants, Dudayev's combatants battled with the Russian Army. But there are also areas in Grozny that are completely intact. There were no combat operations there because there were no combatants. There have been cases, by the way, in which the inhabitants of the city paid Dudayev's snipers and grenade throwers not to "work" on their houses. And the houses of those who could pay escaped destruction. Those without money try to buy their way out by feeding the combatants, preferring hunger to being fired upon.

Grozny is not only and not simple a front. It is a place where a normal person loses all emotion. We argued about why this happens to us too: Can it be simply from the cold and mud? Or is because what we have seen and heard here is too great a shock for a human being?

We walk briskly, in a column pressed against the walls. Despite the fact that there is a truce today, they are firing from the other side—with grenade launchers and mortars. But the soldiers on the front line call this a breather. Most days the intensity of fire is a whole magnitude greater....

...You often hear that the "mazuty" (this is what they call the motorized riflemen in the army jargon) are fine fellows. After just a few days in Grozny, their combat effectiveness is equal to that of any veteran. The "salagi" [raw recruits] demonstrate miraculous feats of heroism. And in general here, at the front, the rigid rule has become established: when they ask the password, it is necessary to fall in the mud immediately and only then to give the password. The soldier knows that if he is not the first to fire, he might not have a second chance. The interaction of the units and combat arms is being worked out.

A major at the front line takes us to a shelter and shows us a passport. It was found in the pocket of one of Dudayev's fallen mercenaries. He was a Russian from Altay, Sergey Bogachev. It is stamped: married 5 November. After that he went to the war to earn some extra money and on 6 January he perished. The major asked us to "publicize this so that it will be a warning to others!" Our soldiers have a special account for Russian mercenaries fighting for Dudayev. You can be sure that they will not be taken prisoner.

By the why, whomever we talked with here, from ordinary soldiers to officers of various ranks, the picture of those confronting our forces is clear. The Chechen "militia" has basically long since dissolved. Whereas individual combatants are encountered who have a "holy war" in their heads, this is extremely rare. There are two "Abkhaz battalions." There is not a single Abkhaz in them. What they are talking about are Chechen fanatics of war who passed through Karabakh and Abkhazia. These are experienced and very dangerous opponents. They are doomed to die. The rest are mercenaries of various nationalities: Afghans, Jordanians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Ukrainians (50, judging by everything, have already been shot to death by Dudayev's people themselves) and very often Russians. These people make up the mobile and professional groups that are fighting against our people. The tactic is this: strike and retreat. The mercenaries receive from \$200 to \$800 a day depending on their qualifications. The "suffering" Chechen people who are so widely advertised by the mass media have long since been sitting in safety or secretly give money to those who fight for them.

Also fighting on Dudayev's side are the "white panty hose"—snipers from the Baltic region, who sometimes use ordinary methods and sometimes cunning. Thus, in one of the units, a sniper suddenly began to "take out" the officers. It is a total mystery how he penetrated a well-protected area. Finally a soldier was able to track down and wound the sniper. The trail of blood from the hurriedly bandaged wound led to a cellar with refugees who had found shelter with the military.

Peacefully living among those who presented themselves as Russian women was the female sniper Layma, who went to "work" on a roof.

The Dudayev people are fighting not only with money but also with blackmail. There are known cases in which they took children away from women and said: "Go to the Russians and find out such and such. Otherwise we will kill your children." They went and they found out all that they could. After all, it was their children.

The Dudayev people know our frequencies very well and listen to many radio conversations, making skillful use of the information. They know many of the family names of our military. Often they interfere in our calls and threaten: "Well, just wait, Ivan, I will deal with you when you return home. And with your family."

Perhaps the main thing here is the infinite fatigue—from the constant inhuman tension, mud, and lack of comfort. This fatigue is so intense that a mortar attack cannot pull a soldier away from his gruel at the campfire.

There is no electric lighting or water. They sometimes bring in water in small quantities. They are helped out by juices and stewed fruit from a canning plant where one of our military installations is located. Sometimes they even wash themselves in juice. And the force holding the region of the railroad station boiled their soup and gruel in juice for four days while they were unable to bring in water on account of the firing. And military people also told us that it was very strange to hear insults aimed at them. Since they were sent here, they are supposed to take the city rather than nurse infants....

In general, practically any one of the tales that we heard about battles is a whole story by itself that is called Hell. These people are heroes. Every soldier and officer who has stood in this mud for days should be given a medal.

When you observe all of this, it confirms your opinion that no army in the world other than ours could fight under such conditions. Any other would simple run away or would die out just from this mud.

War in Chechnya is an incredibly difficult war, the like of which we have not had since 1941. The army that returns from here will be very different from the one that left for this place. It will be an army with a fundamentally different mentality.

We saw everything here. We saw generals who panicked on the battlefield in the sight of soldiers. And we saw other generals who risked their brilliant future and career and even their rank of general to save the lives of

people. We saw the cowardice of colonels who abandoned their wounded comrades to save their own skin. And we saw the infinite valor of other colonels who, themselves wounded, carried other wounded men from the battlefield.

There is unanimity about one thing—they adore their immediate commanders, those who save and bring people out. These soldiers will go anywhere behind their captains and senior officers.

...Next to the Groznyy canning plant stands a high slab, a monument to those who fell in 1941-1945. Next to this date they have written another—1995. And the family names of new dead. And there are many more graves of Russian soldiers in the Russian yards of Groznyy.

We left Groznyy on 11 January. December lingers here. They had 43 days in December here. They live in their own way, according to the calendar of the front. Here they decided that they would celebrate the New Year when they return home. If they return.

Departmental Phone Numbers for Information on Troops in Chechnya

95UM0221B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 Jan 95 pp 1, 3

[Article by Nikolay Starodymov: "Not Listed Among the Dead..."]

[FBIS Translated Text]

'Hot Line' of the Ministry of Defense

The woman was crying. But Col. Anatoliy Larkin did not know what to tell her. For the family name of the officer about whom the woman on the telephone was asking and that was illuminated on the monitor screen appeared on the dry list of "irrevocable losses" in Chechnya.

"There is not yet any absolute certainty," Anatoliy Vasilyevich hesitated to say the fateful words. "call tomorrow."

He himself dialed the number of the military commissariat of that remote city.

"You prepare her and prepare yourselves to accept the deceased..." Larkin asked the commissar.

This is just one episode in the daily life of the chief of an operational group of the Ministry of Defense. Anatoliy Larkin and his comrades are on duty on the "hot telephone" around the clock, ready to tell anyone who calls about the fate of a serviceman performing his duty in Chechnya.

For two days I tried to penetrate the palisade of busy signals. I was not successful. And only when I came to the office where the operational group works did I understand why. Here they register 400-600 telephone calls daily. Is that a lot or not so many? The answer will be obvious when you remember that there are only 1,440 minutes in a day....

The organization of such a line is a new thing for our army. This is why not everything goes as smoothly as it should. They are gaining experience as they work.

At first there were two officers per shift. Now there are four. And this is not many! For the telephone is ringing day and night. They call from every corner of Russia, from Sakhalin to Kaliningrad. It is necessary to speak with each person and to answer everyone. And if you have to give sad news, you must find words of consolation....

"It is hellish work," said Col. Sergey Karasev. "As long as I have served in the army, I have never before experienced such tension.

It would seem that it would be simpler than that: just read the information from the monitor and tell them...but no, it is not so simple.

Col. Anatoliy Larkin showed me the piles of paper that he receives. They are information about the dead and wounded. And by no means is this information always perfected verified. Sometimes the family name is distorted, sometimes the first name and patronymic are incorrect, and sometimes the number of the unit is not indicated. There was one case in which the soldier listed as missing suddenly came to life in a hospital. And information on another fallen soldier arrived here three times, each time with some inaccuracies....

So it is necessary to check and recheck the information.

Fortunately there is dependable contact with the Main Military Medical Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. There, by the way, they also have a similar "hot line" in operation. So that it is possible to obtain information on wounded persons first hand, so to speak. Every day the operational groups exchange diskettes with new information on dead and wounded, prisoners, and missing persons.

I take this opportunity to remind the readers of telephone numbers under which they can learn of the fate of servicemen in Chechnya:

Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: 293-55-92

Air Forces of the Russian Federation: 293-54-05

Federal Service of the Border Troops of the Russian Federation: 224-38-55

Operational Group of Siberian Military District (Novosibirsk): 21-17-84, 21-38-68

Main Directorate of the Commander of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation: 361-84-09

Moscow Interior Military District of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation: 160-27-41, 966-82-51

North Caucasus Interior Military District (Rostov-on-Don): 39-98-62

Volga Interior Military District (Nizhniy Novgorod): 65-69-89

Northwest Interior Military District (St. Petersburg): 219-93-21

Urals Interior Military District (Yekaterinburg): 51-26-48, 58-72-14

Hospitals:

Moscow imeni Burdenko: 263-23-38 Krasnogorsk imeni Vishnevskiy: 562-31-26 Khimki: 572-36-24 Rostov: (8-8633) 1-85-49 Podolsk: 546-89-29 Reutov: 176-44-27, 176-01-20

Main Military-Medical Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: 293-21-29

The "hot line" is indeed hot. It is not foreseen in the table of organization and there are no extra people there. The assigned officers have to "sit on the telephone" for days. Of course not everything works out as they would like. But they are not at fault in this, for they are making a conscientious effort to do their work and to give people the information that they need. And they are thereby sincerely pleased when they can say to someone on the telephone that no harm has come to a particular serviceman.

MILITARY POLICY

Gromov on Grachev, Chechnya, Army Reform

95UM0237A Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 3, 19 Jan 95 p 9

[Interview with Colonel General Boris Gromov by Yegor Yakovlev; place and date not given: "They Will Starve Them Out"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Yakovlev] All of last week, as in previous weeks also, for that matter, the authorities were busy laying the blame for our troubles in Chechnya on whomsoever they could. They continued to point the finger at one another in connection with the armament of Dudayev's army. And the Acting General Prosecutor confusingly announced that he was

prepared to begin the prosecution of top military officers who had refused to execute an order in respect to Chechnya. You have not yet been summoned in this connection?

[Gromov] No. I learned of the General Procuracy's investigation from a television program. What refusal of military leaders are we talking about? It is hard to understand. I, for example, was categorically opposed to the use of the armed forces in the Chechen conflict. If the intention is, however, to institute proceedings against officers and generals who expressed a protest in Chechnya, this also is, in my view, illegal. Among those who refused was, for example, Colonel General Vorobyev. He had his reasons for this. And we need first to investigate them, then issue the threats. No one, however, required the procuracy to announce to the world all that it intends to do. If, on the other hand, it has been entrusted with the functions of deterrence of those who are permitting themselves the luxury of having their own opinion, this is another matter.... As far as the talk about who transferred the weapons to Dudayev is concerned, this is not hard to ascertain: Get hold of the documents—who gave the orders, what was ordered. If this is still not known, this means that there are persons with a direct interest in hushing it up.

[Yakovlev] This same week another trial balloon was sent up by Vladimir Shumeyko—this is becoming his vocation. The speaker declared the expediency of the transfer of the General Staff from the Ministry of Defense to the jurisdiction of the President. The Army cannot for the life of it establish itself in Groznyy, and Moscow suddenly begins to reform the Armed Forces.

[Gromov] Everything appears suddenly with us. I am not a supporter of this idea. According to Shumeyko, this is necessary so that the Commander-in-Chief may influence the troops directly. But, excuse me, who in the Ministry has prevented him bringing his influence to bear on the troops up to now? Second, such reorganization is inopportune: It would require large resources. Everything is, as always, much simpler. A reorganization needs to be carried out in order to be rid of generals to whom there are objections and who will be reluctant to overlook the lessons of the Chechen tragedy.

[Yakovlev] Whatever the conversation today, Chechnya cannot be avoided. Let us take two routes toward it. The war in Afghanistan, which is well known to you. And the events of October 1993, which culminated in the shooting-up of the White House.

[Gromov] As far as Afghanistan is concerned, this of all routes should not have led to Chechnya, if we learn if only some lessons from our history. In all respects, from the adoption of the decisions on the commitment of troops at that time to Afghanistan, and now to

Chechnya, there are tragic coincidences: the same spontaneous approach, the same secrecy, the procrastination when it came to political and economic actions, and the substitution for them of military actions. As far as October 1993, when the Army was pulled into a political struggle, is concerned, the high road to Chechnya leads from there. And then to impasse. There are no values for whose sake it is possible to do what we are doing today. And there is just one solution: Sooner or later, Moscow will have to step on its pride, will have to talk to Dudayev, with his aides, with the people. Otherwise the war will go on forever. The experience of Afghanistan persuades us of this also, incidentally.

[Yakovlev] In his book "Notes of a President" Yeltsin takes Grachev to task for the fact that during a meeting of the Ministry of Defense Collegium he insisted on the President's written order on the use of the Army in the events of 3 October. It is said that, having seen the lines devoted to him, Grachev did not go to the lavish presentation of the President's book. In my view, however, the Minister performed a worthy act when he insisted on a directive in writing.

[Gromov] If Grachev really did demand or, at least, request of the President an order in writing, he acted correctly. In any event, even at this onerous moment the minister had his own opinion. But I cannot say for certain: I did not take part in this meeting of the collegium. I asked those who were there, but they also had difficulty confirming it.

[Yakovlev] Why were you not at that collegium meeting?

[Gromov] What the Armed Forces should do in connection with the opposition of Parliament and the President was discussed for the first time in the Collegium after the appearance of Edict No. 1400. I opposed the use of the Armed Forces for the solution of any questions inside the country. This issue was examined at two collegium meetings, which had already been held on 3 October. First at 1700, then at night, when Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin came to the Ministry. Inasmuch as I had stated my opinion for all to hear, I did not consider it necessary to take part in these meetings also. I proceeded here not from political considerations, taking this side or the other in the conflict, but from moral considerations, which cannot be avoided when an order is given for Russian soldiers to fire at Russian people.

[Yakovlev] A characteristic feature of our time is the suspended nature of personnel. Oleg Poptsov, the leader of Russian television, has been left hanging: He has been half removed, half not. Presidential aides have repeatedly found themselves in the same position. The position of Kostikov, our ambassador to the

Vatican, who continues to speak for the President, is enigmatic. And the rumors concerning you are incessant: Gromov is being sent into retirement. Nonetheless, there is no edict.

[Gromov] I cannot answer precisely why the promised edict has not appeared. Some things are still being decided, probably.

[Yakovlev] Were you friends with Grachev earlier?

[Gromov] There was never friendship, we were bound by joint concerns. I was the commander in Afghanistan. Grachev commanded an airborne division. Relations were absolutely normal. And here also, in the Ministry, I, like Pavel Sergeyevich's other deputies, have tried to tactfully help him and make suggestions inasmuch as his experience is, to be honest, somewhat on the short side. Grachev has altogether very many positive qualities. But he has one decisive shortcoming, which on each occasion leads him onto the wrong path—he very often reiterates: "I myself know everything, I myself know how to manage the armed forces."

[Yakovlev] When did you sense, in the role of Deputy Defense Minister, that Gromov was superfluous to requirements? Let us make the rounds of your fall from favor.

[Gromov] The President signed the edict on my appointment as Deputy Minister of Defense on 26 June 1992.

[Yakovlev] Yeltsin spoke with you?

[Gromov] No one ever spoke with me. People are appointed and dismissed with us without conversation. I sensed animosity toward myself, perhaps, at the start of the summer of 1993. The doctrine of the organizational development of the Armed Forces was being drawn up and discussions concerning use of the troops were conducted at that time. On the territory of Russia included. It became clear to me that there would be a time when not only the militia and the Internal Troops but Armed Forces also would have to act within the country against their own population. I did not care for this. Nor did I care for the fact that much was not being coordinated, was not being discussed, was being decided behind people's backs. The Partnership for Peace program, for example. Then came October 1993—this was a divide in our relations with the Minister.

Finally, the problem of Chechnya. It emerged not from discussion in the Collegium but from reports of the news media on the armament of the opposition. Where

had they gotten the helicopters and tanks from? A tremendous amount of money is needed (how it was acquired was a question also) to purchase munitions and equipment and to hire the people who will control it. But where is all this to be purchased? Helicopters flew in from Brazil, perhaps? I, as Deputy Defense Minister, do not know.

I shall conclude this unpleasant discussion by saying that the Minister assembled his deputies and proposed that three of them, myself included, take part in a competition to fill the one vacant position of deputy. I immediately replied that I would have no part of this competition either on the basis of my service or practical experience or from moral considerations. My colleagues declined also.

[Yakovlev] What is happening in your Ministry is being repeated throughout the pyramid of power, affecting the government and the President's entourage. What is going on? Does it not seem to you that the people in the national leadership have long since lost the sense of the intrinsic worth of their work. All that they have left to their name is a struggle for power.

[Gromov] I compare the events in our country with what is happening in the former Soviet republics, with the Yugoslavia tragedy—I have been there twice and I conclude that you are right. Only a struggle for power towers above us. And everywhere people are searching here: Who is to blame? This is being done merely to accuse one's competitor and to present oneself in the best light and occupy the desired chair.

[Yakovlev] Are you very disenchanted with life?

[Gromov] If you are talking about my personal circle, people close to me, and friends, certainly not. As far as matters on the scale of the state and the Armed Forces are concerned, I am greatly disenchanted. In addition, the situation today is such that it does not lend itself to forecasting even. Nonetheless, I do not lose hope for the future. I hope that what I personally always abide by: honesty, truthfulness, and philanthropy, will once again acquire the right to life.

The spacious office of Colonel-General Gromov, deputy minister of defense, is on the second floor of the former Aleksandrovskoye Academy. All ministers of defense passed through this office in bygone years—Bulganin, Malinovskiy, Grechko.... How many people crossed the threshold of this office, standing to attention in military fashion? Countless! Now there is not a soul here, more often than not. Gromov is alone. It is a month now since he was sidelined from all work, he is given no assignments, and no one ever calls the minister. But Boris Vsevolodovich is a strong individual....

History of Grachev's Relationship With Lebed

OSUM0237B Moscow OBUCHAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 3, 19 Jan 95 p 9

[Article by Aleksandr Nikolayev: "Grachev Is Not a Bird, Lebed Is Not Grachev"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Title is a pun on the names—Grachev means "rook" and Lebed means "swan."]

History of the Relationship of Two Fellow Students

Life brought Aleksandr Lebed and Pavel Grachev together back at the Ryazan Airborne School, when Lieutenant Grachev was appointed platoon commander, and Sergeant Lebed was his deputy. They fought together in Afghanistan and then served side by side in Moscow: Grachev as commander of airborne forces, Lebed, as his deputy. Then their ways parted abruptly....

The first serious falling out occurred at the time of the August (1991) putsch. Lebed was on leave in Tula at that time, and it was there that Grachev's order that he put the Tula Airborne Division on alert and bring it to Moscow caught up with him. Having arrived in the capital, Lebed received a new directive from the commander: Bring up several subunits to the White House, where Boris Yeltsin and his supporters were blockaded, and await further instructions.

With great difficulty, overcoming the resistance of a crowd many thousands strong, Lebed brought up his airborne forces and took up initial positions... for the defense of the White House. He reported to Grachev, and the latter told him that his deputy had understood him correctly. Then Lebed went with a report to Yeltsin: On Grachev's orders he had come to prevent bloodshed.

Emerging from the President's office, the General ran into Vice President Rutskoy in the corridor. The latter was cursing fearfully about the fact that "some idiot has mispositioned the combat equipment." Catching sight of Lebed, he pounced on him. The latter calmly heard out the excited Colonel and said: "I coordinated everything with the President. You are all dismissed, therefore." Rutskoy became even more infuriated: "I fought in Afghanistan, I am a combat pilot!" "Right, and as a pilot you spent half your time looking at an instrument panel, half the time, at the fat ass of the waitress in the flyers' mess hall. Because you cannot fight on the ground, you are dismissed twice," Lebed snapped and went to his men.

Shortly after, Grachev called again and, cursing furiously, shouted down the phone: "Who gave you permission to act precisely as you see fit, what the hell were you doing, barging up to the White House?!"

Marshal Yazov is furious with your actions. Pull the troops away from the building immediately!" Lebed replied stiffly: "Comrade Commander, my office can write, all orders are recorded...." "Very well, don't get worked up, withdraw the troops quietly, I'll think up something," Grachev cooled down immediately. Lebed, cursing, blurted out that "in an emergency you can't be every master's servant all at the same time, you have to make your mind up immediately and without sniveling."

As we know, after the putsch, Pavel Grachev was able to fetch up among the people close to Yeltsin and shortly after became Minister of Defense of Russia. No one in the General Staff doubted that Lebed would take the place of the Commander of the Airborne Troops. But the senior command ordered otherwise.

Failed Banishment

It was proposed that Aleksandr Lebed go to the Dniester region and head the 14th Army. For further career elevation in the central machinery of the Ministry of Defense it is necessary, it was said, to have served as commander of an army, although the appointment of a general of Airborne Assault Forces as the Commander of a ground army looked somewhat odd.

"Grachev wanted even then to be rid of Lebed by any method," Colonel General Vladislav Achalov, former Commander of the Airborne Troops, says. "First, he envied the decisiveness and boldness of his deputy. Second, he realized that the spotless Lebed had a full idea of certain 'confidential' matters of his chief in Afghanistan. Third, Grachev was panic-stricken lest Lebed relate how during the putsch the latter had darted between Yanayev and Yeltsin, affiliating himself with the latter only when the failure of the Emergency Committee had become obvious."

The opinion of Viktor Paramoshin, former military counterintelligence officer, is of interest: "It was assumed that a protracted armed conflict would flare up between Moldavia and the Dniester region. Grachev was hoping, most likely, that Lebed would do something foolish and provoke an international row, in a word, would 'burn up' in this conflict."

There truly was an armed clash between Moldavia and the Dniester region. More precisely, there was an attempt by the Moldavian Army to take the Dniester region. This, according to all calculations, was easy: The Dniester Republic did not have any in any way powerful or mobilized army formations capable of putting up worthwhile resistance. But what happened as the Moldavian troops crossed the Dniester shocked many observers.

When the Moldavian units were moving toward the Dniester region, Army Commander Lebed attempted to contact Defense Minister Grachev to clarify his actions. But the latter did not respond on a single one of the special communications channels, it was as though he had vanished without trace. At his own risk and responsibility Lebed ordered several powerful rocket and artillery attacks: one, against the crossing, a second, against the riverside. The Moldavian units sustained heavy losses and retreated in order by morning to have regrouped and to repeat the attack. One further powerful assault was launched against this area at night, after which Moldavia's desire to continue the combat operations died inasmuch as there was practically nothing with which to conduct them.

The military conflagration that had begun was put out. The victors' glory went to Smirnov, president of the Dniester region, and his five- to seven-man "Ministry of Defense." Grachev also was able to obtain his dividends, but they were not to be compared with Lebed's dividends. The statement of the Army Commander to the officers of the 14th Army on the eve of the events that have been described: "I personally am responsible for my actions, no one else!" sped instantly around all the Armed Forces of Russia. The Russian officers, whom prior to this the politicians had betrayed many times, throwing the troops now into Baku, now into Tbilisi, now into Vilnius and then shoving their blame onto them, noted this action of the general.

In addition, in a matter of hours Lebed became a "national hero" of the Dniester region. The Army Commander came to be lionized. It was felt in Moscow that the popularity of the Tiraspol exile represented a danger to the top army leadership. And not only the army leadership.

The Motherland Hears, the Motherland Knows...

Last August Pavel Grachev made a new attack on Lebed, sponsoring a directive on reform of the 14th Army with the abolition of the position of army commander. Lebed, who was on leave at that time, did not dash headlong to Tiraspol but went to Rostov to the Cossacks, where he was received with enthusiasm. It was clear to everyone that, in the event of harsh measures against the intractable general, he would have the support not only of a substantial part of the army but of the Cossacks also.

Subsequently arriving in Tiraspol, Lebed declared that the 14th Army could not be liquidated at this time and that the defense minister was well aware of this, but those who prepared the directive were simply setting him up. The general was playing it sly, of course, but he

gave Grachev a chance to pull back. Ultimately a compromise was found, and Lebed remained commander of the army.

A row in connection with the appointment of Colonel-General Matvey Burlakov as Deputy Minister of Defense erupted shortly thereafter. Everyone was watching closely to see whether Grachev would be able to push his friend into the high position and how the chief army lover of truth would react to this. Lebed remained quiet for quite some time and then declared on television that "Burlakov has broken down the strongest grouping of forces into molecules, and all the prosecuting attorneys of Russia would like to get their hands on him."

These words had a bombshell effect for they were, after all, heard at the moment that Grachev had already vouched for Burlakov before the President. Although Burlakov was actually appointed, for all that, the officer corps saw for itself once again that there is a general who is not afraid to express publicly the army's opinion.

Naturally, the Ministry of Defense could not forgive this. Grachev decided to send the new-baked Deputy Minister Burlakov to the 14th Army to conduct an inspection. It was a critical situation for Lebed. Were he to show submissiveness and salute a person whom he had just recently called a rogue, his authority would be trampled. Any other actions—a threat to his career and serious liability for insubordination. After all, a deputy minister of defense and an army commander are positions that are not comparable in terms of rank.

Lebed opted for the second and issued a statement to the effect that Burlakov would not be allowed to darken his doorstep. And once more Grachev lacked the grit to openly go against the rebellious army commander. He was afraid of a frontal assault and made a flanking move, saying that Burlakov was not about to go to the 14th Army, this was all just rumor.

The matter culminated in Yeltsin being forced to dismiss Burlakov from office. The president might not have to read the papers, but to ignore the sympathies and antipathies of the army corps is too big a risk.

Grachev's Swan Song

The Chechen campaign has revealed what is, frankly, the professional unfitness of the generals. Lebed, naturally, said about this all that he thinks: "Our dashing generals have dug their horns into the Chechen fence and, seemingly, have become enraged at their own ineptitude and impotence. All this is reminiscent of the Finnish campaign of 1940, when Soviet troops went for the wool, but came back shorn. We need to halt the

slaughter in Chechnya immediately and unconditionally and find out what we have done there."

There is a gnashing of teeth today in the main Russian military headquarters. Grachev has long not given a damn about the journalists' exposures, and the stentorian voice of the uncompromising general is heard even within the impenetrable Kremlin offices. People in the know are hinting that Lebed is attempting to help the President, who has gone astray, affording him room for maneuver and an opportunity to make personnel castlings "under the pressure of the army community."

General Grachev is being spoken of in the central machinery of the Ministry of Defense in the past tense. It is said that a high-ranking official brought to Aleksandr Korzhakov, the all-powerful Chief of the President's security, a former fighter of Dudayev's irregulars, who vividly described the operations of the Russian troops and the real losses. It is said that Korzhakov was beside himself.

Nonetheless, the Defense Minister is persisting in his attempts to settle scores with his former colleague. Three inspections of the 14th Army had been scheduled for January simultaneously, apparently: by a commission of the Rear Services of the Armed Forces, by General of the Army Konstantin Kobets, Inspector General of the Military Council, and by Colonel-General Vladimir Semenov, Commander-in-Chief of Ground Troops. Lebed's subordinates grimly joke: "They've taken after us so seriously that you might think that it was our army that suffered a fiasco in Chechnya." And people close to Kobets are hinting that their boss has an assignment from "the president's people" to either wring Lebed's neck, having dug up compromising material for his dismissal from the army, or to make him an ally of the military-political clan that is close to the president.

But the 14th Army is in a state not only of combat but also political readiness. The personnel recently declared that if there are attempts to oust the commander of the army, the army will withdraw from the Ministry of Defense. This is, of course, an unprecedented demarche, impossible in a normal army, but even worse is possible in "Grachev's army." In any event, the inspectors immediately cooled down. General Kobets even declared that he was going to Tiraspol to collate Lebed's progressive experience, virtually. General Semenov's inspection trip has been set aside altogether. It was feared, possibly, that Semenov, who is respectful of the commander of the 14th Army, could come to his defense.

In short, the execution of the rebellious general has been put off once again. Grachev has "presented" his adversary with a few more points, which will certainly

come in useful for the latter. Lebed, as a political figure, has already powerfully inserted himself between the democrats, whose authority in society is today low, and the odious Zhirinovskiyites, whose slogans scare sober-minded people, and a propitious situation for an assault on the political Olympus has arisen. It cannot be ruled out that none other than Aleksandr Lebed will head the "third force" about which many people are talking in Russia, but which no one has yet seen.

Chernomyrdin Instruction on Housing, Military Commentary

*95UM0250A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 2 Feb 95 p 16*

[Instruction No 102-r, 24 January 1995 of the Government of the Russian Federation signed by Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation V. Chernomyrdin: "Without a Roof Over One's Head"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

1. The Russian Ministry of Construction shall:

establish strict supervision over progress in fulfilling the targets for construction of housing in 1995 for persons retired or discharged from military service into the reserves, foreseen by the State Program approved by a decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation dated 20 July 1993 (VEDOMOSTI SYEZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII, No 32, 1993, Article 1258);

submit information quarterly to the Government of the Russian Federation on the progress of this construction, systematically analyze causes slowing attainment of the targets, and submit proposals on eliminating them.

2. The Russian Ministry of Finance shall ensure continuity of financing of construction of housing for persons retired or discharged from military service into the reserves, and intensify supervision over use of funds allocated for these purposes.

3. It is recommended to bodies of executive government of subjects of the Russian Federation that they:

submit information quarterly to the Russian Ministry of Construction on progress in erecting and providing housing to persons retired or discharged from military service into the reserves;

when concluding agreements to erect housing for the indicated citizens, including on the basis of shares, limit expenditures to create the necessary infrastructure to amounts not exceeding 20 percent

of the total volume of financial resources allocated for construction of such housing;

punish, according to established procedure, officials for diverting to other purposes the resources allocated from the federal budget for construction of housing for persons retired or discharged from military service into the reserves.

4. Jointly with interested federal bodies of executive government, the Russian Ministry of Economics, the Russian Ministry of Finance and the Russian Ministry of Construction shall develop and submit, to the Government of the Russian Federation prior to 1 July 1995, a draft of a program to provide housing in 1996-1997 to servicemen, to persons retired or discharged from military service into the reserves, to associates of internal affairs agencies, and to their families, with regard for the possibilities of the federal budget, actual fulfillment of the set targets in 1994, and the forecast of housing construction in 1995.

Commentary

Comments are offered on the instruction by General Viktor Vlasov, first deputy chief of the Armed Forces Main Housing Operations Directorate.

In accordance with the law, an officer who has served out the established time in military service must be provided housing space prior to retirement or discharge into the reserves. It was for these purposes that the state program of housing construction for servicemen in 1993-1995 was adopted, and we hoped that this would solve the problem completely.

However, massive and hasty withdrawal of Russian forces from the far and near abroad, reduction of the armed forces, and the obvious failures in implementing the program above due to the absence of money led to a situation where many officers are unable to exercise their right to housing prior to leaving for the reserves. Upon arriving at their selected place of permanent residence, they are put on the housing waiting list, and remain on it for years as a rule.

As of today there are a total of 110,000 officers in Russia who were discharged into the reserves and remain without housing. To them we should add another 68,000 who have remained at restricted military posts because they are forced to do so, which in turn creates major problems in providing housing at these posts for newly arriving officers on active duty.

This is why fulfillment of the state program by bodies of executive government of subjects of the Russian Federation is acquiring special urgency. Today's difficulties in housing construction are understandable.

Nonetheless, oblasts that are making an effort to solve this problem are making some headway, though clearly of modest proportions. For example last year 470 apartments were allocated for 4,630 reserve officers lacking housing in Moscow Oblast, and 208 were allocated for 4,211 officers in Voronezh. But in Amur Oblast, where 1,228 discharged officers live, no single apartment was allocated.

The instruction of the Government of the Russian Federation determines more clearly the procedure and deadlines for meeting the housing construction targets in 1995, and the responsibility of officials for implementing the state program. Of course, the success of its fulfillment will depend to a decisive degree on how fully these projects are financed.

Commentary on Amendments to Law on Status of Servicemen

*95UM0251A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 3 Feb 95 p 3*

[Article by Oleg Getmanenko: "There Are Fewer Inconsistencies in the Legislation Now, But..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 20 January the President of the Russian Federation signed the Russian Federation law "On Amending and Supplementing Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation in Connection With Adoption of the Law of the Russian Federation 'On the Status of Servicemen'." Besides the purely terminological refinements, conflicts with "obsolete" laws were eliminated within it, and consequently the benefits granted by the law "On the Status of Servicemen" related to pension support, job placement, retraining, taxation, housing support, administrative rights and freedom of conscience were secured.

Recall that certain "differences in interpretation" of a fundamental nature have become obvious in relation to some of these benefits and rights in the positions taken by interested ministries and departments. A view upon problems associated with the welfare and social health of the serviceman differing from that of the military was revealed in particular in the Ministry of Finance and the State Tax Service.

The subsequent efforts to reconcile the differences ultimately made things impossible for the draft law, which had been prepared long ago, in the rush to finish things up. It was not that it foresaw any additional rights and privileges, or an expanded interpretation of them: No, everything was in strict correspondence with the law "On the Status of Servicemen." The delays carried a high price: While the several typewritten pages and list of amendments and supplements were sent back and forth from one high office to another, and while the draft law endured the debates between

the interested parties with the patience of a marathon runner, and waited in line for legislative action by the State Duma, servicemen suffered moral and material harm.

Consequently this adjustment in laws—a measure that is mundane and purely administrative in any other state—turned out to be a major triumph. It was so to military personnel because out of personal experience they were already familiar with what happens when the “burrs” on the laws aren’t smoothed off with legislative emery cloth: Local executives continued to follow obsolete provisions of legislative acts that didn’t mesh with articles of the law “On the Status of Servicemen.” And consequently the rights of servicemen and their families were violated.

That was the way things were just yesterday. What will change from the moment of enactment of the long-awaited law?

According to explanations received from the Administrative Directorate of the RF Ministry of Defense, nine separate legislative acts were amended and supplemented. Thus refinements in wording and supplements were introduced into articles 90, 92 and 94 of the RSFSR law “On State Pensions in the RSFSR” in regard to calculating and accounting for military service as part of the total time of work. Henceforth total working time will include not 10 years (the maximum), but the entire time the wives (husbands) of servicemen serving by contract were together with their husbands (wives) in places where they could not get jobs in their specialties in connection with the absence of appropriate jobs.

The wording of part 2, Article 34 of the RSFSR Labor Code was changed to correspond with the terminology of the law “On the Status of Servicemen.” The preferential right to remain on the job in the event of a manning or staff reduction is granted to citizens discharged from military service in relation to their first job after discharge from military service; this right is also granted to their families, and to the wives of servicemen.

Article 17 of the RSFSR law “On Freedom of Religion” was supplemented with a fourth part prohibiting creation of religious associations in military units, and a refinement of the wording of part 4, Article 22 releases the command of military units from the responsibility to provide for performance of religious rites by servicemen.

Subitem “ya!!” exempting the amount of pay, monetary remunerations and other payments received by servicemen in connection with fulfilling the duties of military service from income tax is added to item 1, Article 3 of the RF law “On Personal Income Tax.”

A provision giving an property tax exemption to servicemen and citizens discharged from military service upon reaching the maximum military service retirement age, for health reasons, or in connection with organizational and staffing measures who had served in the military for a total of 20 or more years was introduced into item 1, Article 4 of the RF law “On Personal Property Tax.”

Article 4 of the RF law “On Taxation of Property Transferred by Inheritance or as a Gift” is supplemented by a paragraph exempting the families of servicemen who had lost their breadwinner from the tax on transportation resources transferred to their ownership by inheritance.

The wording of part 1, Article 16 of the RSFSR Code of Administrative Violations was changed. Servicemen are now exempt from punishments taking the form of fines and forfeiture of driving rights. The right to make a decision on this issue is now delegated to the command of military units (Article 215).

Supplements having to do with job placement, training, and retraining of servicemen, citizens discharged from military service, and their families were introduced into the RF law “On Employment of the Population in the Russian Federation.” These supplements account for the unique features of military service and of the life of family members living with servicemen. This category of citizens is now included on the list of persons treated by the law as being employed, and requiring additional state guarantees of the exercise of their right to work.

The wording of item 1, part 2 of Article 60 of the RSFSR Housing Code was changed. It now reserves housing space occupied by servicemen on active duty prior to call-up for the entire time of service, and for the first 5 years of service in the case of persons serving on a contract (not to include the time of acquisition of a professional education in military educational institutions).

Still, even if the law “On the Status of Servicemen” were to be implemented “100 percent,” under today’s conditions this would hardly raise servicemen into the socially successful strata of the population, or provide defenders of the fatherland with a worthy status. The clear disproportion between what people in uniform accomplish and what is done by the state for them must not only compel legislative and executive government to think about this inconsistency, but also to implement energetic measures to correct it. All the more so because many provisions of the law “On the Status of Servicemen” still haven’t been affected by the current refinements, and are working incompletely. This pertains to exercise of the right to choose a permanent place of residence, the right of servicemen,

citizens discharged from military service and their families to housing, and benefits in paying charges for housing, municipal services, apartment telephones, and others. As a consequence servicemen compelled by the present state of affairs to undertake improbable efforts to keep their families from falling into the abyss of poverty, in addition to carrying out their regular duties, find that their rights and benefits are devalued.

RESOLUTION of the Extraordinary Session of the Russian Central Voluntary Council

*95UM0193C Moscow POZITSIYA in Russian
No 32 (162) 3 Nov 94 pp 7-8*

[Officers' Union resolution on combating internal dissidents; Moscow, 10 Oct 1994: "RESOLUTION of the Extraordinary Session of the Russian Central Voluntary Council"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

'On the Elimination of the Threat of a Split and the Activities of Provocateurs Within the Officers' Union'

The All-Russian meeting of the Officers' Union this September (150 delegates from 30 regions of Russia, and also Ukraine and Belarus), and earlier the All-Union Congress in April warned all regional branches and leaders of the Union about the real danger of a group of provocateurs and demoralizers who have infiltrated the organization. The initiative in this criminal activity was assumed by former members of the Officers' Union: Yu. Nekhoroshev, V. Kuznetsov, Yu. Pishchulin, V. Kostin.

However, it is not they who are the main cast of characters in the provocations against the leadership of the Officers' Union. The intelligence services were assigned the task of discrediting by any means the Union's leaders and eliminating the organization. The Chairman of the Union is still under investigation, telephone conversations are monitored, there are anonymous threats and letters to FSK [Federal Counterintelligence Service] organs. At this very time criminal-commercial structures are demoralizing with bribery and deceit those who are not firm. Thus Pishchulin and Nekhoroshev foisted worthless stock shares in the overvalued "Renaissance" fund on members of the Officers' Union. As a result the fund disappeared, the shares remain in the memory of those who bought them, and more than one million rubles stayed in the "organizers'" pockets.

The decisive moment has come. It is time to call things by their real names.

A group of political time-servers and demoralizers actively protected the perpetrators of the October 1933 tragedy in Moscow from criticism. Acting Chairman of

the Officers' Union Yu. Nekhoroshev in December 1993 imposed on the interregional meeting of Union representatives a resolution on the inadmissibility of criticism of P. Grachev and other army chiefs for the case of the firing on the Supreme Soviet and for perpetrating an overthrow of the government. It was not by accident that right after the tragic events Yu. Nekhoroshev received an apartment and voluntarily wrote a report on dismissal from the ranks of the Armed Forces, receiving, in so doing, eight official pay rates. At the same time, other members of the Officers' Union were in prison, had hidden from investigative agencies, or were subjected to persecution regarding their service and driven out of the army. Contrary to a decision of the RTsOS [Russian Central Voluntary Council], Yu. Nekhoroshev became a member of the Duma of the RNS [Russian National Assembly] and became A. Sterligov's "right hand." In the same way he turned out to be "left hand" -Deputy Chairman of the Joint Service Union.

Another member of the "parallel center" in the Officers' Union, V. Kuznetsov, taking advantage of conflicts in the communist movement and profiting by his membership in the Officers' Union, infiltrated into the organization of the VKPB [All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)], the SKP-KPSS [Union of Communist Parties-Communist Party of the Soviet Union] (especially in southern Russia) and, at the same time, performing the duties of secretary of the regional committee of the KP RF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] and assistant deputy of the State Duma, traveled around to various cities of Russia, carrying out demoralizing activities in the ranks of the Union.

The following should be added: Nekhoroshev and Kuznetsov gave testimony to investigators from the military procurator's office against S. Terekhov. (They exist in criminal cases.) At the same time, while the Chairman was in prison, he convinced him through attorneys and his wife to give up a political line of defense and the post of Chairman of the Officers' Union.

The "Nekhoroshev Group" is exceptionally dangerous for the patriotic and left movement. It operates step by step, with Jesuitic methods, systematically demoralizing the Officers' Union, first in Moscow and then in the outlying areas. They cover themselves in pretty "left" phrases about "communist ideals" fake patriotic slogans about "unity" with Grachev and company.

A proof of this duplicity is another fact: Nekhoroshev, publicly denouncing the creation of the Power Party, at the same time this February, was one of the organizers of its formation (S. Terekhov was in prison) and to this day is a member of the Political Committee of the party, even formally not intending to leave it.

The ultimate in blasphemy and baseness were recent events that overfilled the cup of patience of members of the RTsOS. After the Union's All-Russian Meeting was held this September and after the anniversary of the September-October tragedy in Moscow (from the organization in which the "Nekhoroshev group" resigned), on 8 October they gathered an assemblage of their adherents of several dozen people (among them were four of the 35 leaders of regional branches and three unauthorized representatives), half of whom did not know with what purpose and which way they were going. And furthermore:

- The Chairman of the Officers' Union was not invited to the gathering;
- RTsOS members authorized by the Council were not admitted;
- Cynically, against the will of General V.I. Varennikov, who is respected among the ranks of the Officers' Union, they "elected," without his agreement, an "honorary chairman" of this gathering. (The RTsOS, actively supporting contact and fighting for the complete rehabilitation of the patriot general, at his own request did not advertise his name in the actions, which could have harmed this case);
- At the gathering they renounced the motto "For Power, Honor, and Dignity";
- A "parallel center" of nine persons, headed by Nekhoroshev was created, and the object of the activities of the dissident group was clearly revealed.

The regional organizations will be informed about the details of the gathering and other facts concerning the "parallel center's" provocative and demoralizing activities in a special RTsOS Letter.

Because of the danger of the provocative activity of the traitors to the ideals of the Officers' Union, who take refuge in the name of the organization and the authority of worthy people, and also the necessity to eliminate the consequences of this activity,

The Russian Central Voluntary Council RESOLVES:

1. The leaders of the regional organizations of the Officers' Union will bring them into a state of heightened vigilance and strict centralized control of the structures in the provinces.

The leadership of local organizations will be carried out only through the RTsOS. The right to give direct orders and directives is given only to Chairman of the Officers' Union Lieutenant Colonel S. Terekhov and, on his instructions, the deputies: Lt. Col. V. Fedoseyev, Lt. Col. A. Popov, Lt. Col. M. Savelyev, Lieutenant General Yu. Kalinin.

2. To suspend membership in the Officers' Union of those of its members who took part in the provocative gathering of 8 October of this year to the extent of personal analysis of the actions of each Extraordinary Commission of the RTsOS under the chairmanship of S. Terekhov (until 15 November).

In a trip to the provinces, to make an analysis of the facts of actions by certain persons unauthorized to represent the organization to the extent of excluding them from membership in the Officers' Union (until 20 December 1994).

3. To eliminate the creation of "parallel groups" within the Officers' Union. Regional organizations in the oblasts and republics will be created only on instructions from the RTsOS in accordance with a mandate certified by the Chairman of the Officers' Union and with a seal.

Comrade officers! We have taken upon ourselves the heavy burden of responsibility for the fate of the Motherland, the honor of an officer, despite execution, prison, and betrayal. Ahead of us is a struggle for the salvation and renaissance of the Nation—Great Russia —The Soviet Union.

Let us rid the country of traitors and the Union of demoralizing time-servers.

Lift high the banner of the Officers' Union under the motto: "For Power, Honor, and Dignity!"

Russian Central Voluntary Council
Chairman S. Terekhov
Chief of Staff V. Fedoseyev

Cases of Generals' Sons Serving in Chechnya

95UM0238A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 1 Feb 95 p 1

[Article by Lt-Col Vladimir Matyash: "It's Not the Pampered Sons of Generals and Officers Who Are Fighting and Dying in Chechnya"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Can the son of a colonel become a general? No, replies an old soldier, because generals have their own sons.

These days this venerable army joke is acquiring more and more new "details." About high-ranking papas with trouser stripes [i.e., generals] generously endowing their offspring with lieutenants' and captains' bars and incredible benefits: posh apartments and stylish limousines. A good many rumors have also sprung up about how cozily and warmly generals' dear sons are fixed up in the service, and how abundantly the stars rain down on their officers' shoulder boards, promotions which are said to be totally out of proportion to their military accomplishments.

I will not attempt to judge; maybe someone from the journalistic fraternity really has been lucky enough to dig up such facts. But even if such articles are totally the fruit of someone's imagination from beginning to end, they, colorfully served up, are having a mortal effect on the minds of uninformed readers and on the parents of soldiers. There, supposedly, they are the type where: they spare their own sons and send ours right into the furnace.

In Mozdok I saw parents trying by hook or crook to get their sons out of the region of conflict. I am not speaking about those who had been wounded. Granted, usually soldiers refuse to abandon their comrades-in-arms. Others want to remain, even after completing their mandatory length of service.

After flying out of Mozdok to Groznyy, I did not intend to raise the subject of whose sons were fulfilling their professional duty there. These meetings happened by chance, but gradually they came together of their own accord to form a certain pattern.

I met Capt Yevgeniy Piterimov, chief of staff of the 276th Motorized Rifle Battalion, in the half-ruined building of a drama theater in Groznyy. Along with his subordinates, he had taken part in battles to take the Council of Ministers' building. He had been wounded. Despite that, he had remained at his post. However, the officer was modestly silent about his own accomplishments; his soldiers told how confident they had felt at difficult moments when they saw their officer alongside them.

"Here you take a special view of the commanders' exactingness and sternness," said Pfc Aleksandr Shaposhnikov. "Their experience and ability to foresee events have saved us more than once in the most difficult situations. They protect us by being the first to rush from one cover to another, and they fire to cover the movements of storming groups."

I looked at the tired Piterimov and at the faces of his grateful soldiers and officers, and I thought: how can I help him in this war? The officer's request was somewhat unexpected for me: to telephone Moscow, to the military academy, and tell his father that his son Yevgeniy was alive and well. He asked that a visit be paid to his wife: his child was ill, and she was having a hard time of it.

The officer gave the name: Maj-Gen Nikolay Ivanovich Piterimov. [passage omitted]

The son of a Deputy Chief of the General Staff of Ground Troops is a Captain and Commander of a motorized rifle company. He has been in Chechnya since the first days of the military conflict. I will not get into telling how the officer shares a mug of water with his soldiers and how he bravely fights the militants.

And I won't give his name. After all, are names the point? I see the essence of these remarks not as glorifying anyone but as conveying the truth to newspaper reporters who have a penchant for sensationalism. The sons of the generals and officers whom I learned of and whom I met on the burning soil of Groznyy are worthy of their fathers. That is why their commanders and subordinates are proud of them.

It is not just the sons of military men who are fighting in the toughest street battles—the fathers are fighting alongside the sons. For example, in the Northern Fleet naval infantry I was told about one extremely courageous colonel. He was nicknamed "Niidzei" for bravery, decisiveness and the highest professionalism. And his son, also an officer in the naval infantry, was wounded in one battle. He was sent to the hospital. He promised his father and comrades that he would return without fail. In order, that is, to stick together until the end.

No, the generals are not hiding their sons from the dangers of military fate. That is not how they themselves were brought up, and that is not the way they are bringing up their successors. [passage omitted]

Like the other officers and sailors who had arrived as reinforcements, Sr Warrant Officer Igor Dyachenko, after learning of the loss of his comrades in the battle for Groznyy, volunteered to go to Chechnya. He most likely could have remained in his unit. In any event, his wife was left alone with four sons. The youngest, Ruslan, was not a year old yet. Nonetheless, he went.

Duty, brotherhood-in-arms—as I became convinced in Groznyy, those are not just fine-sounding words. They are the spirit by which generals and officers, soldiers and sailors live in war. So to ask Sr Warrant Officer Igor Dyachenko, who is also, incidentally, the son of a general, why he made such a choice, was simply inappropriate. [passage omitted]

Officers—Here they are the hope, and the bulwark, and the protection, and simply the comrades-in-arms of their subordinates. Having once and for all chosen the profession of defending the Homeland, they, without getting involved in political squabbles, simply calmly, courageously, staunchly and fearlessly fight for the interests of the Fatherland. They could care less about idle talk about cushy spots and influential papas. Although they, like anyone who is fulfilling his duty without sparing blood and life, are hurt when others shamelessly throw mud at them.

"We," states the appeal by servicemen in the units of the Russian forces located in the Chechen Republic, "are prepared to endure and surmount everything, if people will stop spitting in our faces and shooting us in the back."

GROUND TROOPS

Corp-Brigade Operations Multiply Unit Coordination Problems

95UM0235A Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian
25 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by Pavel Felgengauer: "The Russian Army Will Be in Chechnya for a Long Time. The Seizure of Groznyy Is Indeed Only a Stage of the Operation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Groznyy-Moscow—After the seizure of the palace, the fighting in Groznyy cooled off for a couple of days, as might have been expected. Russian troops are regrouping their forces and putting their rear services in order while Dudayev's detachments are trying to create a new line of defense along the river Sunzha. The framework of the palace, which shows through in many places, is of no interest to either side. As General Rokhlin says, there is no permanent Russian garrison in it—it is just the Russian flag that hangs low and modestly over the northern approach. A little below it, on their own initiative, the naval infantry has hung the naval Andreyevskiy flag.

A couple of days ago there was to have been a meeting of the three Russian commanders (Lev Rokhlin, Ivan Babichev, and Anatoliy Kvashnin) at the walls of the seized palace, but it did not take place, although Lev Rokhlin waited under fire for two hours under cover of the ruins. Chechen snipers and mortarmen from the other side of the Sunzha were firing continuously at any moving target, and Kvashnin and Babichev were unable to get through.

General Rokhlin thinks that the palace is the territory of his neighbor Babichev, but the latter, it seems, is not quite sure of that. The boundaries between the units have always been the weakest points in the Russian Army. Since relatively small consolidated regiments and brigades are fighting in Chechnya, there are especially many boundaries and also complaints that "our neighbor has made a mess of things again." Thus, General Rokhlin is sure that if General Babichev had been able to cover the southern approaches to the palace in time, they would have managed to seize or destroy the Chechen garrison.

But still the Russian military machine has gradually gathered steam—there is somewhat less disorder with the supply and administration, the troops feel somewhat more confident that the tactics of the street fighting have changed. The Russian Army is fighting in earnest. In particular, they are extensively using Shmel rocket launchers to destroy support points and snipers. The former division imeni Dzerzhinskiy will finally arrive in Groznyy either today or tomorrow, and they

will begin to "clean up" in the region of Katama in the rear of the Army forces. Command points will be created, patrols will appear, a curfew will be established, etc.

The new Prime Minister Khadzhiyev says that the "Chechens have learned a good lesson, and one man who has been in combat is worth two who have not." Soon, in his opinion, Chechnya will flourish and become a model neighbor. Today, however, the center of Groznyy to the north, south, and west of the presidential palace reminds one very much of a piece of Stalingrad, and all you meet there are fighters and marauders, but in the suburbs that were less damaged during the fighting, the local population try to arrange something like a peaceful life. On Saturday and Sunday a fairly large crowd of residents with buckets and cans robbed the wine storehouse across from Lev Rokhlin's staff headquarters (cannery). The general ordered for them not to be dispersed—"let them take it all as quickly as they can."

For now, Rokhlin is moving his units to suburbs with single-story buildings in the southeast without any fighting, with the consent of the Chechen population, who themselves are willing to house Russian garrisons on their territory under the condition that the artillery and aircraft stops striking them. Obviously, similar agreements will be consistently offered to all other Chechens. In Groznyy after the regrouping there will be a last serious skirmish, but nobody has any doubt about its outcome. General Rokhlin thinks that the Chechens have ordered the Army to fight to the bitter end in Groznyy because they were counting on aid from their numerous supporters in Moscow.

After that, the troops will indeed leave the city, but they will not go far. Apparently around the perimeter of the city they are creating new military compounds where the units will be stationed, and if there are complications they will be ready to act within a couple of hours after the order is given.

New Konkurs-M Antitank Missile System Profiled

95UM0232B Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian 28 Jan 95 p 5

[Article by Andrey Garavskiy under the rubric: "Arsenal"; "The 'Konkurs' Without Peer"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Earlier we talked about the "Metis," "Fagot," and "Shturm-S" antitank missile systems. Today we present the "Konkurs-M" antitank missile system, which is in the armament of antitank batteries of motorized rifle regiments of motorized rifle and armored divisions.

This system belongs to the second generation of anti-tank missile systems (semiautomatic aiming system). It is mounted on armored reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2M).

The "Konkurs-M" is an effective means of engaging armored targets (such as a tank or infantry fighting vehicle), as well as small targets (such as earth or earth-and-timber emplacements).

In addition practically all combat vehicles of the Special Troops (BMP-1, BMP-2) and Airborne Troops (BMD-1, BMD-2) are equipped with this system.

Basic Tactical Performance Characteristics of the "Konkurs-M" Antitank Missile System

Composition of the system: combat vehicle [BM] 9P148, antitank guided missile 9M113M, launcher 9P135M, KPM 9V871 for technical maintenance of BM 9P148 (GAZ-66), simulator 9F666 for training of operators

Range of fire.....	maximal - 4000.....	minimal - 75
Control system,	semiautomatic over wires	
Rate of fire, rounds per minute.....		3-4
Mass of combat vehicle,.....		1 - 7
Mass of missile in transport and launch container,.....		kg 26.5
Crew.....		2
Basic load, ea.....		15

NAVAL FORCES

Shumeyko on Status of Navy

95UM0192A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 11, Nov 94 pp 1-8

[Interview with Vladimir Filippovich Shumeyko, chairman of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, chairman of the Interparliamentary Assembly of the CIS, and co-chairman of the Council for Cadre Policy of the President of the Russian Federation, by A. Kostin under the rubric "Time and the Fleet": "The New Navy of Our Russia"]

[Text] We offer here for the interest of the reader an interview with Vladimir Filippovich Shumeyko, chairman of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, chairman of the Interparliamentary Assembly of the CIS, and co-chairman of the Council for Cadre Policy of the President of the Russian Federation.

His upbringing in the family of a cadre officer and active conscript military service in the ranks of the Soviet Army, as well as the fact that he was elected to the country's highest legislative body from the "maritime" Kaliningrad Oblast, perhaps define his steadfast interest in the problems of the Russian naval forces and his quite frequent visits to vessels and units of the Navy, as well as the enterprises working in the defense industry. He thus knows firsthand the problems of the sailors.

[Kostin] Vladimir Filippovich! Somewhat of a political stabilization is noticeable in Russia, in my opinion, but it seems that the economic condition of the state continues to worsen. Since that affects the status of our naval forces to a certain extent, I would ask you as chairman of the Federation Council of the RF Federal Assembly to describe briefly the trends that, in your opinion, will predominate in these areas in the near future.

[Shumeyko] The strategy of the new Russian state is just coming into being, since a time of relative political calm and a time for thought has finally come.

It must be acknowledged that all nine years of this time of "troubles" were directed more toward disruption than creation. The inconsistent and contradictory policy of the leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet Union from April 1985 through August 1991, called "restructuring," actually preordained the collapse of the CPSU and the disintegration of the USSR, while the country's economy came to the brink of total collapse. The actions of the first Russian president, the government and the democratic movement, thank God, subsequently put an end to the communist idea as the foundation of nation-building, and to that of the soviets as the form of power in the country.

Today, given the complexity of the situation, facts remain facts—political stability is being preserved in Russia as a whole. The unfounded predictions of opposition leaders of a coming "hot season," to coincide with the anniversary of the events of October in prior years, was testimony to that. The climate in the country and the regions remains relatively calm. Some favorable trends in the development of the economy are also noticeable. It has at least moved from critical to serious condition, but with hope for recovery. One could also have various attitudes toward "Black Tuesday" with its sharp drop in the ruble, but the reaction of the executive authorities and their ability to deal quickly with the causes of the unexpected crisis and, one would like, with its inflationary consequences, are encouraging. I would thus not state so unequivocally that "the economic condition of the country continues to worsen." All of these positive elements of the current transitional period in Russian history, however, are in need of further development and reinforcement through the coordinated actions of all of the branches of power.

Serious factors of "political risk" remain as before. The most important of these are well known—the decline in industrial production, the danger of mass unemployment, the crisis of non-payments, the indebtedness of the state to budgetary organizations, debt obligations to the Russian territories. Each of those factors, taken separately or in combination with others, could make the situation in the country more acute, and cause social unrest under unfavorable circumstances.

With regard to the role of the Federal Assembly and, of course, the Federation Council in stabilizing the situation in society, I am gratified by the fact that we have learned to work together with the State Duma. A two-chamber parliament, after all, is a "difficult" parliament from the standpoint of the legislative process. The Supreme Soviet used to have two equal chambers whose interests did not coincide. The Federal Assembly has a different structure. The Duma, according to the Constitution, should reflect the aggregate of interests of all parties and movements, and the Federation Council the interests of the Russian regions. This outwardly more complicated parliamentary system—according to which, incidentally, many of the developed countries with a federal structure live—in fact has greater merit. The seeming complexity of the legislative process is ultimately directed toward quality.

Close interaction has been set up today between the principal branches of power of the presidential/executive and the legislative—in the form of both chambers of the Federal Assembly—as a whole, and a list of priority legislative proposals has been prepared. The participation of the Federal Assembly in the building of the state consists precisely of their preparation, consideration and adoption.

[Kostin] The spectrum of political parties and movements is more varied and diverse in Russia today. Is there any hope, in your opinion, for the appearance of some, if it may be called thus, nationwide idea around which all of them could be united, sacrificing their own individual party interests?

[Shumeyko] Russia today is experiencing a "troubled" time. It is, as was the beginning of the century, a time of the furious development of multiple parties. Political parties, movements, coalitions, blocs and fronts appear and disappear right before our eyes. The internal party structures of those formations, however, are very fragmented and unstable, and are characterized by factionalism and a virtual absence of regional structures. Most of the parties are of a very "top-heavy," Moscow "nature."

The outlines of the coming Russian political system are beginning to emerge more and more clearly at the same time. Three major blocs can be distinguished: the

liberal-democratic, the national-patriotic with the group of communist parties, and the social-democratic. But time is needed for their full emergence, and quite a bit of it, although two primary trends can already be discerned—the aspiration of the party leaders to reinforce independence and raise their political weight, as well as an understanding of the vital necessity of forming blocs with other, more or less kindred structures for the sake of increasing their overall potential and, ultimately, for the sake of fighting for power. I would particularly like to emphasize, however, that a change in power for the sake of power itself should not be possible. Our society should be confident that any of the electoral blocs will preserve the accumulated values of our Russian state and the hard-won democratic freedoms for centuries under a civilized approach to power.

The Treaty of Social Consent, as you know, was signed in April of this year in the Kremlin, and Russia gained a unique opportunity for almost all of the political forces to devise a unified idea and, on the basis of it, a strategy for the development of the new Russian state. The primitive notions of economic reform—still prevailing in Russia to this day, in the climate of "irreconcilable" opposition—as some kind of technical task that could be resolved quickly by making the "correct" decisions to guarantee positive results, on the one hand, and our mistakes in the course of economic reform that are connected with the failure of liberal economic theory to coincide with Russian reality, on the other, testify that Russia is experiencing not so much an economic crisis as a crisis of way of life, a crisis of ideas.

A uniform and unified idea for all of Russia is badly needed today. And until we define what state we are building and what the way of life of the people will be, we cannot build any democracy and we cannot create any civilized market. I am confident that the idea of the American society of consumption, the making of money as the meaning of life, cannot take here. The supremacy of the spiritual over the material has always been more significant for Russia. Russians, in other words, have always been distinguished by a rich spiritual world, an unselfish and acute sense of justice.

That is all the more important for our armed forces, where a vacuum has formed in the patriotic indoctrination of the soldiers since the collapse of the communist ideology.

[Kostin] That pertains to the internal situation in the country; what changes can we expect in the international positions of Russia, and first and foremost those affecting its security and the assurance of national interests?

[Shumeyko] The army and the whole system of national security occupy a strong position in a powerful nation, and are called upon not only to protect the freedom of the citizens inhabiting that state but also to constitute the foundation of strong power.

International relations up until recently, in the era of the Cold War, were defined by and large by the presence of two poles, two superpowers—the United States and the USSR. The system of security of the United States protected and protects the freedoms of American citizens therein, defined as democracy, an open market economy and the American way of life. The security system of the USSR protected the freedom of Soviet citizens as a "conscious necessity" to build communism, founded on centralized management, a planned economy and the Soviet way of life.

Our relations with the United States have been radically altered today, and are moving into a qualitatively new stage—from mistrust to cooperation, from confrontation to partnership, from an arms race to cutbacks and limitations in them. There is no more two-pole model of the world, there is no basis for confrontation. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany and the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Eastern European countries, and especially Germany and the Baltic countries, have all affected this to an absolute extent. These positive phenomena, however, are regarded by the majority of our citizens as unilateral concessions to the West, including the sharp worsening of the state of the Russian armed forces in this regard. The time has thus come for us to learn to separate clearly the international and national aspects of both security and collaboration. The more so as the United States, even since the end of the Cold War, has continued to strengthen its army as the foundation of national security. I will cite a few excerpts from a document titled "U.S. National Security Strategy" that was submitted by President Clinton to the U.S. Congress in July of this year:

"The armed forces, with a regard for the realities of the era since the Cold War and new threats, should have such numbers and displacements of forces that would meet the various requirements of our strategy, including an ability to triumph in two major regional conflicts occurring almost simultaneously in conjunction with our regional allies. We will strive as before to reach agreements on arms control, for the purpose of reducing the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict and to ensure stability..."

"Our country, even after the end of the Cold War, should have armed forces that would be adequate to counter various security threats and, if it were to become necessary, to wage combat operations and gain victory over our enemies. Assurance of the security

and well-being of our country depends on many factors, none of which has as much significance as the men and women that wear the American military uniform and are on guard for our security. Their professionalism, service and dedication constitute the core of our defense. Our armed forces are the best equipped and provided in the world today, and I firmly intend to do everything to see that they remain so... We are restructuring our system of military research and development, giving preference to the development of dual-use technologies, which will raise the competitiveness of our goods and simultaneously meet the needs of the Department of Defense. We are also reforming the system of procurement of weaponry and military hardware, thereby raising the efficiency of development and the procurement system."

Commentary is superfluous, as they say. In my opinion we must draw a clear line today, in the emergence of the national security of our country, between actions under the conditions of the former Soviet Union and the new, democratic Russia, remaining nonetheless a great and respected Power around the world. We must immediately devote steadfast attention to the needs of our Russian army, and assist it. And that depends in principle on us alone—on the legislators—since the primary lever for that, budgetary regulation, is in our hands.

The fact that the military budget has a clear trend toward reductions in recent years is not so terrible. The army itself is being cut back as well. This trend, however, is not commensurate with the negative effects of its structural restructuring, which consists of the fact that the spending for the upkeep of the army has doubled, expenses for NIOKR [scientific research and experimental design] have tripled, spending on procurements of military hardware have increased by two-and-a-half times, and spending for capital construction has doubled. The expenses for the upkeep of the army and for capital construction are rising in the face of overall cutbacks in the military budget, as we see, but the growth is being achieved at the expense of sharp cutbacks in the contributions of the state to scientific projects and the procurement of arms. This, while seemingly saving the army in a social sense, is threatening the collapse of the military-industrial complex, which could bring the army as a whole to the same sad end.

[Kostin] The leading maritime countries today are making more and more use of their fleets for foreign-policy actions, including those of a so-called peace-keeping nature, and thus their attention to augmenting their combat potential is not abating. Russia, as has frequently occurred during difficult times in its history, is beginning to lag further and further behind them in this regard. Will we not be transformed, as a

result, into a state that they will not only not need to reckon with, but upon whose national interests they will encroach as well? Something like that has happened several times even in this century, after all.

[Shumeyko] The Security Council of Russia is proposing the review and adoption of a conceptual framework for the national security of our nation at the end of this year; it will consider in detail issues of military security, as well as a whole series of legislation to support it in specific areas. The Federation Council will be taking an active part in this difficult and painstaking work.

The geopolitical position of Russia has been radically altered compared to the USSR with the end of the Cold War, to my mind for the better. The period of dangerous confrontation with the leading powers of the West has been left behind. Russia has no enemies for the foreseeable future. Its security in a military regard could be threatened only by regional conflicts that arise close to the Russian borders—today the Caucasus and Central Asia—as well as the penetration of militarized bandit groups onto our territory from outside. I am far from the idea, however, that Russia, a great maritime power, does not need a navy. And even though its tasks have been clearly and markedly altered compared to those that were put before the enormous Soviet nuclear-missile fleet, intended for confrontation with the combined fleet of the United States and its allies, these tasks need not be reduced just to the protection of Russian fishing resources against foreign encroachments.

Does our country need a navy? The navy is the pride and honor of Russia as a world power, its great glory. Speaking more matter-of-factly about the specific nature of the present day, we must make real corrections in the construction and development of the fleet as a constituent element of the armed forces of Russia. The tasks of the fleet, its structure and composition should be adjusted in accordance with the new geopolitical climate, favorable to our country, the current conceptual framework for its national security and, most certainly, our economic capabilities.

[Kostin] World and our own experience suggest, however, that missed opportunities to maintain such a complex and expensive state organism as a naval fleet, as well as its development for the long term, lead inevitably to much greater expenditures to restore it. It has moreover been virtually impossible to achieve the necessary results in a short period of time. The statements going around that the change in the climate alters priorities, and that we will rapidly increase the might of the fleet, seem to be superficial at the very least. What point of view do you hold personally on this issue?

[Shumeyko] First of all, all of our former "likely adversaries" have been making cutbacks in their naval forces since the end of the Cold War. Three primary factors dictate the necessity of such cutbacks for Russia. They are, as was noted, the improvement in the geopolitical situation surrounding the country with the reduction in the tasks of the Navy corresponding to it, the limited economic capabilities of Russia during the transitional period, and the rapid aging of a considerable number of the vessels created under the conditions of acute military confrontation of an enormous fleet, which was patently superfluous even for that period. The submarine fleet of the Soviet Union, for instance, had by 1990 surpassed in number of submarines the fleets of all other nations taken together. We built twice as many strategic missile submarines alone than the United States.

Russia has moreover become less "maritime," and more "continental," in a geographical regard than the former USSR. Its maritime boundaries in the Baltic and the Black Sea have been reduced by more than three times, and in the Caspian by five times. The length of the land borders has even increased at the same time. The reduction in the vessel inventory of the Navy, under these conditions is thus nothing extraordinary, catastrophic or "disastrous," but rather seems entirely well-founded and timely.

The cutbacks that are being pursued, it should be emphasized, will of course in no way impede the modernization of the ships remaining in service or the construction of modern new ones. On the contrary, scientific research and experimental design should continue, which will make it possible for us to have the most modern and powerful navy with significant cutbacks in the number of vessels. I am thus seriously troubled by the distortions in the current military budget. There is not a single political party represented in the State Duma, after all, whose program does not talk about a strong nation. These two concepts—the armed forces and a strong nation—still apparently exist separately for many of the deputies.

The operating range of the naval strategic nuclear weapons currently exceeds 10,000 kilometers. The creation of defensive lines at sea against the platforms for those weapons is clearly unrealistic. A better—and already existing—restraining factor against the employment of such weapons is the ability of our fleet to inflict an answering blow. There are thus insufficient grounds to pose the question of creating an oceangoing fleet for actual battle with nuclear missile submarines. The planned program of mutual cutbacks in strategic nuclear arms is far more promising.

The operating range of conventional naval armaments is markedly lower, and the creation of individual lines against the platforms for those weapons seems more

realistic. Their creation, however, aside from everything else, would inevitably lead to new confrontation and an arms race, which is clearly contraindicated by our ailing economy and contradicts our political strategy. It is thus obvious that the question of the ocean-going functions of the navy should be resolved today at a minimum: maintaining the ability of the available forces of the Northern and Pacific fleets to perform individual tasks in distant zones as participants in peacekeeping operations, fighting piracy, performing rescue operations etc. We should be prepared, at the same time, to alter our priorities in the development of the Navy in the event of negative changes in the military-political situation. The fleets in closed maritime theaters should be oriented toward actions of a coastal nature in the nearby maritime zone.

[Kostin] Vladimir Filippovich, you were elected to the Federation Council from "maritime," if one may put it thus, Kaliningrad Oblast, the future status of which, by analogy with the Kuriles, elicits a certain, shall we say, unease among many Russians. What is the situation there today, and what guarantees are there of stability for its inhabitants, naturally including the naval sailors?

[Shumeyko] I would like to emphasize, first of all, that I have a very negative attitude toward any speculating on changes in the status of Kaliningrad Oblast. That territory was, is and will be Russian. Its remoteness from the mother country creates certain problems with transit and customs barriers, and impedes an increase in production capacity and the creation of new jobs. The Ukaz of the President of Ukraine titled "Kaliningrad Oblast" that was adopted at the beginning of December of last year unfortunately is not in effect in practice. The decisions of the authorities are unfortunately not being fulfilled, as is the case everywhere in the country. But we are trying to do everything possible on the part of the Federation Council to help resolve the urgent problems of the almost million Russians living there as quickly as possible.

We face the task of the fastest possible adoption by the parliament of the Law on the Status of the Oblast. We also have responsibility for all issues connected with the disposition of our troops and arms there, as well as the construction of housing for servicemen in Kaliningrad.

[Kostin] You, among the leading politicians of Russia today, are the one who perhaps visits the ships and units of the Navy most often, so you know better than others how difficult the service of the sailors is because of the low pay, lack of everyday amenities etc., but most importantly owing to uncertainty regarding the future. Even though a law on the status of servicemen has been adopted, it is not only largely unrealized, but rumors persist regarding its coming reconsideration in

the direction of reducing the level, or even abolishing entirely, a number of benefits. But in that case we would lose the cadre officers once and for all, since such an obvious example of the attitude toward them would give them no faith in the stated promises of future concern.

[Shumeyko] I have been closely associated with the army all of my life. I was born in the family of a cadre military officer. I went with my father, like any officer, from unit to unit, and had to travel across the country quite a bit. I myself served. I was, and try to be, *au courant* on matters connected with our armed forces. I know what goes on there from more than the newspapers alone; I often visit military units, from around Moscow to the Northern Fleet. These trips are important to me from more than a political standpoint alone. I have, if you will, a kind of personal affiliation, even passion. I passionately feel all of the problems of our armed forces, including the Navy. I always try to do everything that is up to me to see that the Federation Council has as attentive an attitude as possible toward the urgent issues of the existence and vital activity of the army and navy. That approach, it seems to me, was manifested during the approval of the state budget for this year, and as you know, we were able to achieve positive shifts in the financing of the armed forces.

This is not the first time that rumors of a reduction in the status of servicemen and the abolition of a series of benefits have appeared. I certainly cannot promise mountains of gold. We unfortunately have to deal with the economic realities of the present day. But we will permit no diminishment of the interests of the Russian army and navy. The deputies of the Federation Council, myself included, have come forward with a series of legislative initiatives to protect the interests of the servicemen and veterans of the army and navy. The Federation Council takes a very simple and clear stance on questions of the armed forces—Russia should have a clearly formulated military policy and doctrine to ensure the interests of the national security of our state.

[Kostin] Finally, a last and traditional question for you. How do you feel that we arrive at the 300th anniversary of the regular domestic navy?

[Shumeyko] I know that deputies of the State Duma have expressed apprehensions in their questions that under today's conditions, the celebration of this noteworthy anniversary could be reminiscent of a wake for our navy. But I feel that is totally out of place to talk about wakes. Historic changes have occurred in our country and in the world. Mankind has for the first time in recent decades gained real hopes of getting rid of the sword of Damocles of global warfare between the two "ism's." Russia is defining new priorities for itself in military security, including the fate of the Navy,

under these conditions. True, we must admit that the ultimate answers to the questions of what it should be, and what tasks it will have to accomplish, have not yet been found.

The anniversary of the fleet would still seem to be opening up a new stage in its brilliant history. This stage is more the qualitative improvement than the quantitative growth of the fleet. And success in the creation of a compact and highly effective fleet, that puts professionals of the highest class to sea furnished with everything necessary in work and in life, should be the principal achievement of the coming anniversary.

Impact of Economy on Naval Aviation

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in Russian No 11, Nov 94 pp 44-45

[Interview with Major-General of Aviation Anatoliy Vasilyevich Tikhomirov, chief of combat training for naval aviation, by Yu. Morozov: "Do Not Fear Difficulties, Surmount Them..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The complexity of the economic situation in the nation cannot help but affect the state of the country's armed forces. The sharp reduction in the appropriations for the upkeep of the Navy, including its aviation, as well as the cutbacks being pursued in aviation units and subunits, the decline in the service lives of aviation hardware, and the scarcity of spare parts, fuels and lubricants are a far from complete list of the reasons for the significant reduction in flying time under plans for combat training. This has been discussed and written about many times. Combat work among military fliers, however, is known not to have stopped, and they continue to perform the tasks entrusted them. The editors asked the chief of combat training for naval aviation, Major-General of Aviation A.V. Tikhomirov, to answer a series of questions in that regard.*

[Morozov] Anatoliy Vasilyevich, you have just come back from the Baltic Fleet, where end-of-period performance-graded evaluations were performed of the fulfillment of combat training tasks by the aerial forces of the Baltic Fleet in 1994. Please tell us about the principal results.

[Tikhomirov] The command of the air forces of the Baltic Fleet, under the difficult conditions of reforms and financial and economic difficulties, has devised a comprehensive and clearly thought-out program of training for the flight personnel, and has coordinated and focused the activity of all commanders and staffs of the aviation units on the accomplishment of the assigned tasks. It must be noted, however, that despite

the steps that have been taken, including non-traditional ones, the state of flight training has worsened markedly even compared to last year. That naturally has a direct impact on the combat readiness of the units, and on flight safety.

Suffice it to say that whereas the stipulated plans for flight training were 70-percent fulfilled for naval aviation as a whole in 1992-93, even though that did not provide flying time for all crews sufficient to guarantee the maintenance of skills at an ability level to perform their intended combat mission and provide for a safe outcome to the flight, the plan for flight training—even sharply reduced and repeatedly adjusted downward—was fulfilled at just 56 percent this year. The primary reason for this state of affairs was the shortfall in aviation fuel. Only 14 percent of the quota allocated to the Baltic Fleet air forces came in during the evaluations. A similar situation, by the way, has taken shape in the other fleets as well.

All of this has forced us to direct the flight training of naval aviation units primarily toward maintenance of the proficiency of combat-ready crews from among the supervisory flight (instructor) personnel, and the restoration of flying skills among crews after prolonged interruptions in flying.

The actual combat readiness of fleet aviation was evaluated in the fall, during the command and staff exercises under the supervision of the commander of the Baltic Fleet. All of the combat exercises with weapons delivery were performed at the "excellent" level even under those conditions. The deputy commander of an air regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel V. Alyayev, and helicopter squadron commander Lieutenant-Colonel Ye. Kumskov, among others, displayed good training, doggedness in the achievement of the assigned tasks and persistence in the accomplishment of tasks in a difficult climate. These flight units and the command of the air forces in the Baltic Fleet were assessed as "good" according to the results of the evaluation.

[Morozov] What difficulties are the commanders of the air units encountering most frequently in the performance of combat training tasks? Are they the same for all branches of naval aviation, or specific to each?

[Tikhomirov] I have already partially answered that question in speaking of the shortages of fuel. While the aviation engineering service in the units can somehow manage to maintain the aircraft and helicopters in good working order for flights under the combat-training plan, even with the cutbacks in the deliveries of spare parts, for example by switching units from one craft to another, there is nothing that can replace fuel, after all, and nowhere to borrow it.

[Morozov] Do you consider the quantity of flights actually being made under the combat-training plan sufficient to preserve the attained level of combat readiness among flight crews? What reserves are there to raise it, in your opinion?

[Tikhomirov] Of course not. Flying time of no less than 100 hours is needed every year to maintain an attained level of combat readiness for flight crews. Less flying time leads to a decline in flying skills and, as a result, the danger of an accidental outcome to any flight. We have thus been forced to proceed to the creation of a so-called "core" in the flight units; that is, a certain portion of the pilots or crews is given priority in the fulfillment of the combat-training plan. They are provided first with the greater portion of the fine stream of fuel that comes to us. They are, as a rule, the flight instructors.

The remaining pilots and crews make do with what is left, and that, you understand, is not much at all, and they rarely get to go up. There are unfortunately even pilots and crews that have not gone up this year at all. Commentary here is superfluous, as they say.

[Morozov] But "flights" in simulators can preserve flying proficiency to a certain extent. What is the state of affairs in that area today?

[Tikhomirov] The available simulators, owing to the lack of deliveries of constituent parts, are unfortunately idle, as for instance in the helicopter squadron of the Baltic Fleet. We have to compensate for that with simulations in the cockpits of the helicopters, or by "walking through" flights on the ground; if the state of financial support remains at its former level, then to all appearances this will become the principal means of preserving flying proficiency in 1995.

[Morozov] What is the morale and psychological climate in the aviation units where you were working during the end-of-period evaluations?

[Tikhomirov] I was pleased that despite the difficulty of the overall situation, the personnel of the aviation and support units being evaluated performed the tasks assigned to them with enthusiasm and strove to show all the better what they are capable of, they were genuinely "rooting" for the outcome of the evaluations. At least I didn't see anyone who was indifferent.

[Morozov] What aviation units in the Baltic Fleet would you cite as the best from the results of the evaluations, and what positive experience from their work could you recommend to others?

[Tikhomirov] The flight personnel of the detached ship ASW helicopter squadron commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Ye. Kumskov displayed good proficiency during the evaluations. Twelve crews were trained

there for landing on ships over the year. The squadron participated in three joint exercises with ships of the Baltic Fleet and NATO. The helicopter pilots made a total of 106 flights with landings on their own and foreign ships. That is under conditions where Lieutenant-Colonel Kumskov has been in the post of commander of that squadron for just one year since completing the Naval Academy, and a harmonious collective in the unit headed by squadron chief of staff Lieutenant-Colonel Z. Khalikov supported the high-quality training and accomplishment of the assigned tasks. "Do not fear difficulties, surmount them" is the motto of the personnel of the squadron, and that could undoubtedly be recommended to others.

[Morozov] In conclusion, what are the distinguishing features of the combat-training plan for 1995 compared to the year now ending?

[Tikhomirov] The combat-training plan for the 1995 training year has undergone significant changes compared to this year's, primarily connected with the reform of fleet aviation. Its basic goal and main task, however, remains as before—to keep a certain quantity of flight crews among the personnel at constant combat readiness.

Problems of Dividing Black Sea Fleet Revisited

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[Article by Mikhail Shcherbachenko and Mikhail Shchipanov: "Rules of Multiplication and Division—*The Tree of Integration of the CIS Member Countries Should Have a Strong Root System*"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] I will make the caveat right away that these notes are the result of several conversations by the authors with prestigious politicians and businessmen, of chiefly centrist coloration. Understanding perfectly well that history is no longer rewritten, they do not want to make the same mistakes twice.

They recall with unkind words the aphorism of the primacy of politics over economics. And they know very well that a look behind the purely political actions of the national-radicals, coordinated with the ruling circle, will discern the infamous "hand of Moscow."

One must of course remember, in evaluating various models of economic re-integration, that only naive and frivolous people do not see concrete economic interests behind any group actions. And there are thus entirely specific lobbyists betting on the further breakdown of the once unified economic organism.

The chain of restraints and counterbalances in our economy is evident. The rupture of traditional ties

within the unified economic complex of the former Union is leading to the shutdown of the largest enterprises.

It is clear to everyone that it is far easier for the tax services within Russia to follow the formula "money—oil—money," counting up the presumed taxes. The difficulty of this operation increases many times over abroad. The seller's hands have been untied, at the same time, and money by the billions is thus sitting in Western banks, while the blood drains from our economy, thirsting for investment. So disintegration is for some ruin and the fear of unemployment, and for others it is simply mother's milk.

So the question of the actual ways of overcoming the consequences of the feast of sovereignties moves to the forefront, while one can feel Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan sliding into the company of the Third World countries, if not the Fourth World.

There are infinitely many factors leading to the sole logical conclusion under these circumstances, that without the restoration of ties a single prospect shines for the countries that are the legacy of the Union: to become firmly established as states with purely raw-material, subsidiary, semi-colonial types of economies. The members of the CIS, after all, are proving to be many years behind in their industrial development, and have ended up facing the necessity of reinventing the wheel. The wager on the creation and strengthening of the economy of the industrial nations leaves no choice; there is nothing except comprehensive integration, with the activation of the entire potential of the former Union within the context of the historically extant division of labor.

There is always a place for paradox, although not always artificial, in our political life. Our exceedingly erudite neighbors have preferred to illustrate the situation of the unbalanced Eurasian economy using the example of the story line surrounding the Black Sea Fleet—the bone of contention between brother Slavs.

The question of questions—how to divide the BSF—is being popularly replaced with another one: how can it be not divided? How can a unified, indivisible fleet be preserved? A recent incident, when a Ukrainian An-12 military aircraft in neutral waters, without any apparent cause and quite unceremoniously, was escorted by two Turkish fighters, was too effective to prevent Kiev from evaluating it on its merits. Namely, they began thinking about whether it is worth dividing the fleet if the closest neighbors, having increased their naval firepower considerably (there is information that the total missile firepower of the Turkish Navy has increased by more than a third over the last three years), are beginning to feel themselves the complete masters in that region.

No one, of course, is hungry for the development of the scenario for the worse in the Black Sea, but how is one to perceive the attempts of Turkey in NATO to obtain naval bases in Romania, refit the Turkish Navy with new frigates specially ordered in Germany and, finally, the attempts of Ankara to violate the existing conventions and alter the procedures for the passage of the Black Sea straits for oil-bearing tankers? If these are not pretensions to the role of regional superpower, then what are they? And what, if not the mournful prospects for the Black Sea Fleet (doomed, as many experts feel, to a slow and agonizing death in the event of division), is nourishing Turkish ambitions?

And if you heed no arguments but your own and divide the BSF, then how can one divide, say, a cruiser and its escort ships that provide cover and refueling? There are many similar questions to which it makes no sense to expect an answer. One thing is clear—the fleet will cease to be a fleet, a formation able to provide for the defense of the interest of both countries—after this "fair" division. The ships could be sent for scrap metal with a clear conscience. Our knowledgeable neighbors, meanwhile, do not rule out that many firms, having already grown fat from the export of scrap metal, are ready to lobby through trusted intermediaries for a plan for the accelerated division of the fleet in the hope of a major, quick windfall.

The picture is a frightening one even if we disengage ourselves from such versions. The Black Sea Fleet, hostage to wearisome contradictions, has left the Mediterranean, and that puts both Russia and Ukraine in an extremely disadvantageous situation, taking into account the situation in the Balkans. The international legal status of the Black Sea, of which Russia remains the guarantor as the successor to the former Union, continues to be violated and destroyed. The capabilities of the RF to counter this—under conditions of the heretofore unresolved conflict with Ukraine—are exceedingly limited. The division of the fleet could moreover have unpredictable consequences in theory, since the two newly formed naval formations would never be able to rule out the study of a staff scenario of their direct armed clash. What a horror... But that is one version; one cannot fail to take it into account.

Is any new confirmation needed of the fact that both the obvious and the hypothetical consequences of the division of the BSF, in any proportions, surprisingly—or rather, surprisingly naturally—has something in common with the results of the extremely clumsy break-up of the ties of the former Union?

Even though a fleet collision is not seen to be too sweeping, of course, against the background of the post-Soviet quasi-civilized divorce, it helps us to clarify yet again general features in the relations of the

fraternal republics. In the standard mathematical operation of division, the once common property of each of the parties turns out to be a far smaller piece in hand than was planned on the "calculators." [passage omitted]

REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Vorobyev on Social Protection for Troops Fighting Chechens

95UM0221A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 Jan 95 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Col. Gen. Vasiliy Vorobyev, chief of the Main Directorate for the Military Budget and Financing of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, by Ivan Ivanyuk: "The Participants in the Battles Will Be Socially Protected in Full"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Deprivation and difficulties and danger to health and life itself have always accompanied those wearing shoulder boards. One among the difficult tests that have been the lot of Russian servicemen in recent years is the conflict in the Chechen Republic, where Russian soldiers and officers perform their constitutional duty while remaining faithful to their military oath.

In situations like this, the state has provided measures of increased social protection for those who pledged allegiance to the Fatherland and it is important that the privileges and guarantees provided by legislation be well known not only by the servicemen themselves but also by those officials upon whom depends the realization of the rights of the Russian soldiers who are serving in the country's "hot spots," the hottest of which is now Chechnya.

The editor's office appealed to Col. Gen. Vasiliy Vorobyev, chief of the Main Directorate for the Military Budget and Financing of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, with the request that he tell about the rights of servicemen engaged in the operation to restore constitutional order in Chechnya and about the new documents that have been adopted to raise their social protection.

[Ivanyuk] Vasiliy Vasilyevich, to provide for particular social guarantees for servicemen, is it necessary to specify what the army is doing in the territory of the Chechen Republic? Are there such documents?

[Vorobyev] Yes, there are. Under Decree No 1360 of the Government of the Russian Federation from 9 December 1994, the performance of the tasks to guarantee state security and the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and the rights and freedoms of citizens in the territory of the Chechen Republic and contiguous regions of the North Caucasus is related to

the performance of tasks in armed conflicts. On the basis of this decree, these directives were issued by the chief of General Staff: 10 December—on the granting of the corresponding guarantees and compensation to personnel; 14 December—with a declaration of the list of military units and operational groups being brought in to perform the indicated tasks.

I remind you that under existing legislation a number of privileges have been established for servicemen performing tasks under the conditions of an emergency situation and in armed conflicts. Thus, for those performing military service under contract, the base pay and allowances are doubled. For those who have been inducted into service, the official pay is in the amount set for contract personnel whose positions can be held by soldiers, seamen, sergeants, and petty officers (wage categories one through four).

[Ivanyuk] Tell us, what are the procedures for the payment of larger sums? Are they necessary in Groznyy and its environs?

[Vorobyev] The procedures and amount of pay and wages are determined by the orders No 285 for 1993 and No 133 for 1994 of the Ministry of Defense. Provision is made for the payment of money at the place of regular service of servicemen and the principal place of work of civilian personnel. These payments may also be made in the established manner to family members and other persons, whereby they can be mailed to them by money order. In accordance with the latest guiding documents, I have given instructions to the chiefs of financial-economic directorates and departments to issue basic pay two months in advance to servicemen being sent to perform tasks in a zone of armed conflict, and thereby to pay out a compulsory one-time money reward to all those who have earned it through the conscientious performance of their service duties in 1994.

Yesterday the chief of the General Staff signed and sent to the forces a directive that specifies the procedures for the payment of money to servicemen undergoing medical treatment. Those of them who spend more than a month in the hospital will receive pay there at their request.

[Ivanyuk] What other privileges and advantages does those who are now serving in Chechnya have?

[Vorobyev] One month of military service counts as three in the determination of years of service for the awarding of pensions. Such a favorable calculation of service time also applies to the time that the servicemen spends in treatment in the event that he is wounded or becomes ill. Servicemen serving under contract are granted additional leave amounting to 10 days for every three months of military service, not

counting the time in transit to the place of rest and back. Servicemen serving as conscripts have the right to additional short-term leave after six months of performance of tasks in a zone of armed conflict. For sergeants and petty officers, it is 30 calendar days, whereas for soldiers and seamen it is 25 calendar days, not counting time on the road.

[Ivanyuk] Right now, when restorative work is getting started in the Chechen Republic, civilian personnel of the armed forces are being brought here. What privileges and guarantees do these people have?

[Vorobyev] Government Decree No 341 "On Additional Privileges for Civilian Personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation" has been in effect since 19 April 1993. In accordance with this document, the official pay is raised 100 percent for the days of actual stay in the zone of an armed conflict and also additional paid leave of two calendar days is granted for each full month of work at the "hot spot" but not to exceed a total of 14 calendar days.

In addition, in accordance with Decree No 1440 of the Government of the Russian Federation from 31 December 1994, civilian personnel as well as servicemen serving under contract are given field allowances or daily pay for the entire period of the duty assignment equal to three times the established norms—15,000 (5,000 X 3) rubles [R] a day.

And, finally, there is a quite fresh document—Decree No 19 of the Government of Russia "On Additional Payments to Persons in the Chechen Republic" signed 12 January. It specifies the size of material aid with respect to employees who have suffered in the zone of the armed conflict.

[Ivanyuk] This problem is still much more pressing with respect to military people. It is the sacred duty of the state to provide material assistance to the families of fallen soldiers and officers and to support those who lost their health in battle. What do the legislation and other normative acts provide in the event of precisely such tragic circumstances?

[Vorobyev] In accordance with Decree No 295 of the Government of the Russian Federation "On the Procedure for Compulsory State Personal Insurance for Servicemen and Citizens Called to the Military and for Enlisted and Command Personnel of the Internal Affairs Bodies" from 5 April 1993 (announced in the armed forces by Order No 246 of the minister of defense from 6 May 1993), servicemen are subject to insurance against accidents through the state for the entire period of their service. They also have a right to this privilege in the event that the insured event—death or disability

as a result of impaired health in the course of service—commenced within one year after the end of this privilege.

In the event of the loss or death of an officer, warrant officer, individual in extended service, contract serviceman, or female in military service, 25 salaries are paid out for each family member. And in the event of the loss of a serviceman serving under conscription, 25 minimum wages are paid for each family member. The family members with the right to receive the insurance sum include the wife (husband), the father and mother of the insured person, and also his children who have not reached the age of 18 (up to the age of 23 if they are students). In addition, the family members are paid in equal shares a one-time allowance amounting to 120 salaries (minimum wages).

If a disability is determined for the insured person during the period of his service, the size of the insurance sum will depend on the disability group. A disabled person is paid 75 salaries (monthly minimum wages) in group one, 50 salaries in group two, and 25 salaries in group three. In the event of a serious injury (contusion, trauma, or mutilation), the payment is 10 salaries, whereas it is five salaries for a minor injury.

The corresponding documents are prepared by the commanders of the military units and regional military commissars. The payment of the insurance (one-time allowance) to servicemen from Moscow is made by the Military Insurance Company (103160 Moscow, Rybnny Per., D. 2). For the rest of Russia, the payments are made through departments of the Savings Bank.

[Ivanyuk] Vasiliy Vasilyevich, how well organized is the mechanism for insurance payments? Is it not getting bogged down by the complexity of the situation and by unforeseen circumstances of various kinds?

[Vorobyev] I want to say that we have gained a certain amount of experience in working with the Military Insurance Company and no problems have arisen yet. More than 50,000 insurance cases have been handled in the last year and a half and more than 150,000 payments have been made for a total of about R100 billion. But I will admit that there are now many more complications than before in the drawing up of the necessary documents for the receipt of insurance sums. The main complication is that it is mostly composite units and combined units that are fighting in Chechnya. The immediate commanders of the dead and wounded, who under the existing statute must draw up the documents on the insurance cases, are often located far from Groznyy. Therefore, to avoid red tape and confusion, after a preliminary agreement with the Military Insurance Company we and the chief of the

Main Military Medical Directorate signed a provisional instruction on the procedure for the payment of insurance sums to servicemen whose health became impaired in the zone of the Chechen conflict. Its main objective is the most effective organization of the drawing up of the necessary documents on each case of injury, contusion, mutilation, or trauma. A report form has been developed that will be filled out by the military medical establishment before the end of inpatient treatment. The properly registered first copy of the report and the personal application of the serviceman must be sent immediately to the Military Insurance Company. There if necessary the salaries will be specified with our help. We are also counting on the active assistance of the financial agencies of the military medical establishments. If all of the necessary documents reach the Military Insurance Company, the payments of insurance sums to injured persons as well as to the family members of servicemen who have perished will be made no later than within a few days. We are trying to make sure that this is done as quickly as possible.

I also want to report on one very important document that has come to light recently. Through the intervention of the Ministry of Defense, Directive No 50-r of the Government of the Russian Federation was signed on 14 January 1995. In accordance with this document, we are permitted to compensate outlays for the travel of two family members of a serviceman who received a wound or contusion while performing his military obligations in the zone of an armed conflict or of his closest relatives from the place of their residence to the medical establishment and back once during the time of treatment. It is understandable that difficulties will arise with accommodation and feeding in a strange city. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense will also pay for the renting of housing and will pay a daily allowance in the amount determined by legislation for official business. It is thought that the presence and support of the persons closest to one will contribute to the rapid recovery of our soldiers.

[Ivanyuk] Unfortunately, not all officers and soldiers are able to return to their formations. What do the laws of our country provide for them and their family members besides insurance and one-time allowances?

[Vorobyev] If after treatment the serviceman is subject to discharge from military service with the determination of a disability, then the disability pension will be paid to him at a higher rate as a disabled war veteran depending on the disability group (85 percent in groups one and two and 50 percent of the corresponding pay and cost of the food ration in group three).

Pensions to families of servicemen who perished in the performance of their military duty in the territory of

the Chechen Republic are paid at higher rates, whereby in the event of the loss of the breadwinner the pension is granted to mothers and wives upon reaching the age of 50 under preferential conditions, that is, regardless of whether or not they are dependents of the breadwinner. In addition, the wives of the fallen servicemen who care for the children under eight years of age of these servicemen attain the right to a pension in the event of the loss of the breadwinner regardless of age and ability to work and regardless of whether or not their spouse is working. If it is a matter of cadre servicemen and their families, then their pensions are granted by the military commissariats at the place of residence. But if it is a matter of members of the military in compulsory service and their families, they are granted by agencies for the social protection of the population.

In conclusion, I want to emphasize that despite the difficult financial situation in which the armed forces found themselves in connection with the default of the budget, we will do everything that we can to make sure that those who perform their military duty in Chechnya are socially protected in full.

MoD's Efforts To Foster Domestic Computer Industry

*95UM0232A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Jan 95 p 5*

[Article by Aleksandr Yegorov: "The Defense Ministry Builds Data Command and Control Nets Based on Domestic Computer Companies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The exhibition of computer technology intended for use by the RF Defense Ministry (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, November 25, 1994), which was held at the end of November, did not go unnoticed. It was highly rated in specialized "computer" publications. You may remember that the Directorate of Informatization and Automation of the RF Armed Forces (UIA VS RF), subunit of the General Staff (Chief of Signal Communications of the RF Armed Forces), about whom little has been known to this day even to the readers of this newspaper, was the organizer of the exhibition.

Meanwhile, the reform of the command and control system of the Russian Armed Forces depends largely on the successful work of precisely this subunit. For it is solely responsible for organizing development of the scientific basis of computer technology in industry, for experimental design developments of ASU [automatic command and control systems] and computer hardware, and for implementation of the whole program of informatization of the military department.

At present, associates of the directorate are "curing" the development of command and control systems for the RF Armed Forces in several directions. They are engaged in the creation of automatic command and control systems both for daily activity and for extreme situations, and of general-use computer equipment from large computer systems to personal computers. Under their jurisdiction is the developed automatic command and control system for mobilization resources, which is intended to combine the structure of military commissariats, troop command and control elements, and state industrial enterprises in a data net with the General Staff, the central command and control element of mobilization resources of the RF Armed Forces. In addition, they are developing a telecommunications system for the Defense Ministry (we plan to talk about it separately), and future command and control systems for the mobile forces being formed, and for military lines of communications, and even a system for data support of the war against crime in the RF Armed Forces, which was created by presidential order.

This impressive volume of tasks—and by no means everything has been enumerated—creates an equal number of problems. One of them is supplying the staffs, command and control centers, central and main directorates, institutions, line units and other organizations of the Defense Ministry with general-purpose computer equipment and software. Says the Chief of the Directorate, Maj-Gen Viktor Bazhenov, "Tardy and incomplete financing of signed contracts not only disrupts the deadlines for supplying the troops with up-to-date computer equipment, it also greatly increases the cost of the work."

The general's concern is understandable: the low profitability of domestic producing firms (in fact no more than 10-12 percent, in comparison with the hundreds of percent of the companies importing computers into Russia) does not make cooperation with the Defense Ministry (at this stage—A.Ye.) attractive and does not actively promote the development of Russian products, something in which the military department, with a requirement of 50-60 thousand computers annually, is extremely interested. In addition, the Defense Ministry follows an iron rule in choosing its suppliers: do not buy imported computer equipment, but equipment produced in Russian enterprises using imported components.

In the opinion of Viktor Bazhenov, in addition to the obvious "plus" of effective supply of the Armed Forces with up-to-date computer equipment, this brings closer the moment when the domestic industry, after assimilating analogues of the main components and accumulating scientific-technical and production reserves, will switch to our own developments, corresponding to the world level.

And these are not just good intentions, but an objective need, springing from a number of causes that make it impossible to use imported components in systems which will be on combat duty, in the command and control of mobile forces, and also in automatic command and control systems in a "special period." One of them, a delicate question, lies in their probable "loads" (various types of viruses and hard-to-detect spy "booby traps" capable for example, of shooting stored information into the air waves—A.Ye.).

For this reason, at the start of this year, jointly with the Goskomoboronprom [State Committee of the Defense Industry] of the Russian Federation, a document was signed that defines the list of suppliers of computer equipment for the Defense Industry. It included several industry leaders, among them the AO [joint-stock company] "IVK" (Moscow), AO "KPO VS" (Kazan), the KB [Design Bureau] "Korund-M" (Moscow), AO "NITsEVT" (Moscow), AO "Evrika" (St. Petersburg), AO "RAMEK" (St. Petersburg), which produce serial equipment using imported components—microprocessors and frames for them (so-called "red" assembly).

In connection with press reports regarding a drop in demand for "red" assembly computers, which allegedly has occurred because of low quality and poor service maintenance, some users have begun to doubt the advisability of acquiring domestic products.

A leading specialist of the Directorate of Informatization and Automation of the RF Armed Forces, the Chief of the Department of Computer Technology Lt-Col Sergey Manokhin, sees no grounds for such doubts. What is more, he considers the problem itself, of "white" (company - brandname) assembly and "red" assembly, to be largely an artificial one.

He says "We can assemble computers from imported components as well as the best world companies."

And he explains this first of all by the fact that our industry didn't at "day one," but with a specific level of technology in the field of computers, and with strong specialists.

As for the quality of the "red" computers and service maintenance of companies producing them, here too in the words of Manokhin, "there is no complaint. The AO 'IVK' for example, provides service maintenance to its clients on the entire territory of the Russian Federation within 48 hours. None of the users have yet complained that the acquired equipment does not perform its required functions."

And by all appearances they won't complain, since the production of computers from components is organized at a high level input control. The suppliers are the same as for brandname companies—IBM, Dell,

etc. Assembly is done in a technological manufacturing cycle adopted throughout the world: testing of components before assembly, testing during assembly, testing of finished models. And acceptance of the finished goods is through a system of military representatives working at each enterprise in accordance with the technical specifications of the Defense Ministry and special test programs for these specifications. The level of demands of the military representatives on the goods is high. This is common knowledge. The three-year guarantee for computer equipment, offered by all suppliers of the Defense Ministry, is eloquent proof of the quality of the work they accept.

This is why the military does not worry about the quality of domestic computers. They are much more worried about the stability of financing, on which the purchase of the component elements depends, and about the development of domestic technology for production of computer equipment, and ultimately about accomplishment of the program for supplying the Armed Forces with computer equipment.

In the Northern Caucasus, Far Eastern, Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts in the coming year fixed automated command and control systems based on up-to-date computer technology should already be

functioning. Each of them will constitute an integrated territorial or regional computer network, "woven" from local command and control networks of the district staff based on powerful 486 personal computers, Pentium file-servers and a central server of the "Unix" type, and of local networks of staffs of operational formations tied to the district, to main staffs of armed services and to the General Staff over a telecommunications system or initially by modem.

As the special software is developed, these networks will be lead to command and control systems that are connected to the center. And one day they will be connected in a single great system of the Defense Ministry, for which nothing will be impossible. With its assistance, the information on the computer of a division commander serving in the Far East, the situation on the map of the CINC of an air formation in Archangel (in color graphics), or the "state of health" of a ballistic missile on alert duty can be viewed from a Moscow office. With its assistance, it will be possible to be wherever necessary, in real time. And this is not very far in the future. How soon will depend largely on the effective work of the Directorate of Informatization and Automation of the RF Armed Forces.

UKRAINE

Progress Toward START-1 Treaty Fulfillment Discussed

95UM0241A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
24 Jan 95 p 1

[Unattributed article under the rubric "International Review": "Nuclear Disarmament Almost at Our Own Expense"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Supreme Soviet of Ukraine approved a resolution in November of last year for the accession of Ukraine to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] as a nation not possessing such weapons. The process of nuclear disarmament in the world was actually launched thereby. A way out of the difficult situation into which Ukraine had fallen by inheriting the nuclear weapons deployed on its territory from the former USSR was finally outlined. Our state, having gotten rid of its negative image, was now organically a part of the world community, without complexities and restrictions, with all of the consequences arising therefrom. The sword of Damocles that has been hanging over the people of Ukraine and its land will soon be taken away.

We would also point out that Ukraine has actually already begun the realization of the terms of the START-1 Treaty, which was ratified by the Supreme Soviet in 1993. Forty missiles have been taken out of service, and more than 300 nuclear charges have been removed to Russian enterprises for their further dismantling and destruction. This has moreover been done for the SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles, the most modern in combat characteristics, as was stipulated in the trilateral declaration of the presidents of Ukraine, Russia and the United States. The accession to the NPT is a new and substantive step toward complete nuclear disarmament. Our state, in short, has done virtually everything in this area that has been asked of it by the world community.

But here we must address the problems that have unfortunately arisen, are arising and, certainly, will arise before the young and still economically weak Ukrainian state. Colonel Volodymyr Tertychnyy, the deputy chief of the center for administrative control of the strategic nuclear forces of the MO [Ministry of Defense] of Ukraine, has directed our attention toward them.

Ukrainian specialists had earlier compiled estimates showing that the expenditures for nuclear disarmament are almost equal to the expenditures for the arms themselves, and that the burden lies heavily on our state budget. The comprehensive program of gradual cutbacks in land- and air-launched nuclear arms we

have developed will be another 2.5895 billion U.S. dollars "in the cost area." Whence it is obvious that Ukraine is unable to fulfill completely the obligations of the START-1 Treaty without appropriate assistance from the world community.

But it is well known that the United States has promised to allocate 350 million dollars in the near future under the Nunn-Lugar law, and then possibly another 100 million. The other developed Western countries have also promised 10—15 million dollars each. These sums, added together, make a definite impression. But they are granted with certain restrictions, and thus do not reflect the true dimensions of the assistance that could be given to Ukraine.

The United States, for example, under that same Nunn-Lugar law may offer assistance only for the needs of disarmament (in the form of equipment and logistical support manufactured at American enterprises), and only in fulfillment of organizational and legal procedures stipulated by the estimate. And if we total the spending for the performance of various types of tender offers, the conclusion of contracts, the shipment of the equipment and the logistical materials to Ukraine—most of which, by the way, could be manufactured here—and the arrangement of the system of servicing and support, then the sums indicated above begin to melt before our eyes.

And we still have to fulfill requirements pertaining to the rehabilitation of the environment in the places where the destructive components of the missile infrastructure were located, and provide for the social status of the servicemen who are being discharged in the process of realizing these liquidation measures. The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine estimates that some 700.5 million dollars will be required for this latter alone, as well as 95 million for ecological safety and 1.4365 billion dollars for the liquidation measures, including the recultivation of lands.

Ukraine has so far actually received equipment and logistical materials in assistance worth more than seven million U.S. dollars, even though the current U.S. administration, as has become known, has promised to increase aid to Ukraine for these purposes. One would like to see that these promises do not remain just promises.

The highest officials of our state and Ukrainian diplomats turn out to have every grounds to demand an increase in assistance from the world community for the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine. The amounts should correspond to the spending and the amounts of work that are being performed in this area. It is also obvious that the assistance should be granted, so to speak, in advance, and has to compensate for more than the cost of the liquidation measures alone. Our

own indicated interests in the spheres of ecology, safeguarding of the environment and social protections for Ukrainian servicemen, finally, should also be taken into account.

Discussions With Americans on Missiles, Launchers

**95UM0241B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
26 Jan 95 p 1**

[Unattributed article: "The Funds Exist. How Are They Being Used?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A working group from the U.S. Defense Department headed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense John Roberto visited Ukraine from January 10 through 12. The primary aim of the negotiations and consultations of the American specialists with the Ukrainian delegation was to seek ways of making the most efficient use of the funds that have been allocated by the U.S. government for the elimination of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

The specialists from the Ukrainian military department discussed with the American specialists the receipt of special equipment in Ukraine and the construction of the necessary facilities and structures. Members of the American working group visited the construction site of a storage area for the components of liquid missile fuel that is being erected in the town of Shevchenkovo near Kharkiv with U.S. assistance, and they also visited Pervomaysk, where they inspected missile launch silos: a training one in which the technology for destroying the launch silos was worked out, and an empty one that is subject to destruction.

During the negotiations the parties reached agreement on the fact that the social problems of the missile soldiers will have to be solved concurrently with the pace of destruction of the Ukrainian missile weaponry.

Meeting on CIS Military Cooperation

**95UM0241C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
26 Jan 95 p 1**

[News item from press service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine: "Questions of Cooperation Will Be Considered"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A working group of the staff for the coordination of military cooperation among the CIS member nations, headed by consultant to the secretariat of the Council of Ministers of Defense of the CIS Member Nations Colonel-General Herman Burutin, arrived in Kiev from Moscow on January 24.

Questions of the further cooperation of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine with the staff coordinating the

military cooperation were reviewed in the course of a working meeting with representatives of the Ukrainian military department.

Novohuyvynskyy Tank Plant To Produce Pipelayers

**95UM0241E Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
3 Jan 95 p 1**

[Unattributed news item from Zhytomyr: "Pipelayers Instead of Tanks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The retrofitting of production for the output of "civilian" products is being pursued successfully by the workforce at the Novohuyvynskyy Tank Repair Plant in the Zhytomyr area. The output of consumer goods and items of close to 50 types in the machine-building field has already been set up in the shops that have been freed from the filling of military orders. Sets of process equipment for brickyards, stonemasonry tools, pipelayers, machine tools for the processing of hides etc. all enjoy demand. One of the wings of the repair plant has been set aside for the refitting of freight trucks, to equip them with diesel engines.

The "requalification" of the military plant has had virtually no impact on the economic indicators of the workforce—they are working as profitably as before. The enterprise maintains a workers' village and subsidiary farming and is building housing, all with its own funds.

The Zhytomyr Elektrovymiryuvach Production Association, the Korostenskyy Road Machinery Building Plant, the Korostyshivskyy Electroprylad Plant and a number of other enterprises are also implementing conversion successfully.

Antonov Aircraft Displayed for Turkmenistan's Niyazov

**95UM0241D Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
25 Jan 95 p 1**

[Unattributed news item: "Acquaintance With the Antonov Aviation Innovations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] President of Turkmenistan Saparmurat Niyazov, who is in our country on an official visit, visited the test field of the Aviation Scientific and Technical Complex imeni Oleh Antonov [ANTK] in Hostomel with Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma on January 19. The distinguished guest was shown the latest aircraft created recently at the ANTK. These included the An-225, the famous Mriya, the An-70 and the An-32(P) firefighting aircraft.

The President of Turkmenistan devoted particular attention to the An-74TK-100 aircraft, and it was no accident. The General Designer of the ANTK, Petro Balabuyev, after all, informed the UKRINFORM correspondents that today, while only the testing of this new aircraft is underway, the Turkmens have declared their interest in acquiring a group of them. And that is natural—the An-74TK-100 is an all-purpose aircraft. The craft will be able to operate with equal success in either passenger or freight versions.

BALTIC STATES

Formation of Doctrinal Concepts of Baltic Countries

95UM0189B Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian
No 10, Oct 94 pp 7-9

[Article by Major-General A. Meshkov and Colonel A. Nikolayev: "The Formation of the Doctrinal Concepts of the Baltic Countries"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The idea of a pan-Scandinavian union that is being discussed in government, diplomatic and military circles in the Baltic countries has gained new resonance today, first and foremost owing to the continuing attempts of the leaders of a number of European nations to find new approaches to improving security structures. A regional, coalitional combination of the countries in the Baltic Sea basin could potentially be part of a future overall security system in Europe.

This form of political and military integration, in the evaluation of Western specialists, would envisage alliance obligations only for a particular period, in the absence of unified coordinating bodies and a joint command in peacetime. They assume that such a coalition would face the following tasks: creating military-political conditions for the peaceful development of the countries in the region that adhere to a policy of armed neutrality; filling the "vacuum of influence" on the part of the former USSR, with prospects for the formation of a "field of trust and security"; coordinating efforts within the framework of coalition obligations to repel possible aggression without the use of outside military might; and, resource conservation in the course of national military development.

American experts note that the initial stage in the realization of this conceptual model should be the mandatory leveling of doctrinal views of the members of the future coalition on its aims, the nature of possible wars in the region, and the preparation of armed forces for them, as well as methods of waging them. Sweden, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are prepared for that today.

The vested interest of the American leadership in solving the problem of the Baltic region became apparent during the visit of U.S. President Clinton to the Baltic countries in July of 1994. That testifies once again to the aspirations of the West, on the one hand, to make more active the process of military-political integration of the countries in the region, which could create a considerable counterbalance to Russian policy in northern Europe in the long run, and not to worsen relations with Russia on the other.

The security policy of Sweden is founded on the principle of "independent defense," with simultaneous active participation in European integration processes. The concept of the country's non-participation in military-political alliances in peacetime, in order to observe neutrality in wartime, constitutes the basis of this policy (which has been pursued since 1834). No country, in other words, shall take part in the defense of Sweden in the event of war, and it will not act on behalf of any nation or coalition of nations. All of this requires the availability of its own, powerful armed forces.

The country's leaders feel that the threat of an attack on Sweden has effectively been removed, but a potential military danger supposedly emanates from the "high concentration of Russian forces in northwestern Russia and in Kaliningrad Oblast." The instability of the situation in a number of republics of the former USSR is also fraught with the outbreak of armed clashes on social and ethnic grounds, into which Sweden could be drawn. Western observers note the increased role of international organizations in averting such conflict situations, which in the opinion of Swedish political scientists does not permit the country to stand apart from their activity.

Adjustments are always being made, for the aforementioned reasons, in the foreign policy of Sweden in the direction of a departure from the traditional policy of neutrality. One example of that is its intention to join the European Union in 1995, which testifies to the country's readiness to collaborate with all of the nations in it in the area of ensuring security and averting conflicts in Europe. The aim of such actions, in the evaluation of Western experts, is to create a base for the full-scale participation of Sweden in the political and military structures of the system of European collective security. The realization of this military-political aim is being sought in a deepening of all-round collaboration with the members of the European Union, the arrangement of close contacts with the leading NATO powers and a strengthening of interaction with the countries of Scandinavia and the Baltic.

The changes in the conceptual provisions of the security policy of Finland, in the opinion of Western political scientists, were caused by the instability of the

political and economic climate on the territory of the CIS nations, and principally the presence of conflict between Russia and the Baltic countries. This was reflected most vividly in the foreign policy of Finland—making every effort to avoid being drawn into crisis situations that could result in its becoming a target of military operations. The doctrinal provision of "military non-alignment and independent defense in the event of war," according to the evaluations of Finnish political scientists, does not conform to the climate prevailing in the Baltic region. Their opinion is that Finland currently needs to re-orient its foreign policy, restricting this concept to "non-participation in military conflicts." The possibility of joining the West European Union (WEU) is not ruled out in the future, if that organization is transformed into the foundation for a European system of security.

The Finnish leadership places greater hopes on an expansion of military-technical collaboration with the Western countries, thanks to which it will be possible to gain access to modern military technology in order to improve the situation in the national military industry.

The leading circles of the North Atlantic alliance are trying to push Finland into joining the bloc. It was announced as long ago as October 1992, at a session of the NATO nuclear planning group, that "Finland meets all of the requirements posed toward members of the alliance."

The leading European NATO countries and the United States are encouraging the intentions of Finland to alter its policy of neutrality and make military-technical collaboration with the West more active. The principal impediment to a rapprochement with NATO at this point, according to the political-science research of Finnish scholars, remains the forced orientation of Helsinki toward the stance of the Russian leadership on issues of regional security.

The Baltic countries (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia) have developed foundations for national defense strategies that consider the possibility of the outbreak of a "special critical situation." The Baltic states could come under the influence of internal or external pressure (terrorist acts, provoked conflicts, border incidents, "peacekeeping" operations performed by Russia and not sanctioned by the UN). Those countries, having concluded treaties on common security, will in the opinion of the West not be able to protect themselves in a prolonged armed struggle. Such a provision is a basic reason for the necessity of creating a common security structure in the Baltic region able to monitor the situation effectively and, where necessary, to activate the armed forces of the regional coalition for the joint defense of national interests.

The military-political leadership of NATO, with a regard for the pro-Western orientation of the Baltic countries, has become more active in its efforts of late to expand all-round ties with them. A mutual vested interest in the formation of an effective mechanism for monitoring and influencing the development of the situation in the Baltic region lies at the heart of this process. The leadership of the United States in particular has declared it to be a region of its vitally important interests, since the geographical situation and foreign policy of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia create favorable conditions for the pursuit of a policy of force by the West in relation to Russia and the other CIS countries.¹

Western experts, at the same time, consider this region to be a potential seat of the outbreak of military conflict, owing to the unresolved territorial problems that exist there and the discriminatory policies being pursued by Latvia and Estonia against the Russian-speaking population. The North Atlantic alliance is trying to establish a presence in the region and, relying on the overall anti-Russian thrust of the military-political policies of the Baltic countries, to limit Russia's sphere of influence.

The leading countries of the alliance, taking into account the fact of the positioning of Russian troops on the territory of the Baltic states, in the first stage (1992-94) provided only assistance in the training of cadre military personnel and the creation of the structural foundations for national armed forces that would be compatible with the NATO forces, and able to counter possible aggression for the period of time necessary to obtain international aid in order to preserve sovereignty (refraining therein from the supply of arms and military hardware).

The second stage, whose principal substance is the development of plans for concrete joint activity and clarification of the dimensions of the aid from the bloc for strengthening their national security, effectively began with the signing of the "Partnership for Peace" document by Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia at the beginning of 1994. The primary focus, as was emphasized during a visit by NATO Military Committee Chairman Field Marshal R. Vincent to the Baltic countries in March of 1994, must be placed on the development of collaboration based on the conclusion of bilateral agreements in the military realm, which would *de facto* signify the creation of a regional security system.

NATO approves of the efforts of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to create a Baltic union, considering it to be a catalyst for the process of rapprochement of the North Atlantic union and the Baltic countries. The formation of a unified system of defense for the Baltic states, based on close interaction with the joint armed forces

of the alliance, would in fact signify the creation of a "buffer zone" between the West and Russia, meeting the interests of both NATO and the countries of Northern Europe.

The leaders of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are experiencing certain difficulties in the development of national military doctrines, but they are counting on completing their creation in the near future with the aid of Western experts, primarily from the United States.

A likely threat to the security of countries in the region, according to evaluations by analysts at the ministries of defense of the Baltic states, comes from Russia, Belarus and Poland (the "first ring"). A worsening of relations of those countries with Germany, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (the "second ring") could have a marked impact on the situation in the Baltic basin. A worsening of conflicts among the countries of Western Europe and the eastern region (the "third ring") also cannot be ruled out. A number of factors that create the most realistic threat to the Baltic are delineated, including the overall political instability in the CIS countries, especially in Russia, and the "increasing concentration of troops in Kaliningrad Oblast," among others.

The following tasks will be entrusted to the national armed forces under these conditions: stop, blockade and slow enemy actions; counter incursions in all sectors; determinedly defend the territory, preventing alteration of the state order; and, in the event of occupation by the forces of national armed forces and irregulars with the involvement of citizens of the republics, provide for the functioning of government and continue the fight using partisan methods.

The concept of "total defense" ("popular defense") is the main element of the military doctrines being developed by the Baltic countries. It envisages the waging of defensive actions by armed forces using conventional means, as well as interaction with all government administrative bodies.

The leaders of the Baltic countries intend to make use of foreign experience in building national armed forces, in the interests of their subsequent integration into the military structures of the West. Most experts are coming to the conclusion that the Finnish version of a defensive conceptual model is the most acceptable for the Baltic countries. They feel that it will provide them with the status of armed neutrality given their small but well-equipped armed forces, and will make it possible to create conditions for effective participation in both regional and the European-wide systems of security.

The developments in the realm of doctrinal concepts on issues of defense that are being accomplished in the countries of the Baltic region testify to the desire to create a regional security system oriented toward the West as a counterpoise to the policies of Russia in the region. The influence of Western security structures will increase considerably in northern and northwestern Europe with the realization of these plans, and conditions will be created for the acceptance of the countries in the region into those organizations.

Footnote

1. For more detail on the plans of the United States in the Baltic region, see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE No. 2, 1994, pp 9-11.—Ed.

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Inspections, Audits Reveal Hidden Problems in Ministry of Defense

95UM0231A Almaty KARAVAN in Russian No 4, 27 Jan 95 p 9

[Article by Vitaliy Zuyev and Kayrat Kasymov: "Ministry of Defense Happily Hands Out Millions, but Toothpaste Is No Cure for Pediculosis"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Ministry of Defense is among those tightly closed agencies where "insiders" usually do not air their dirty laundry in public. And since the republic still does not have effective civilian oversight of enforcement structures, they resemble a quiet pond with virulent underwater currents. Only rarely does some "unsanctioned" information surface, as bizarre as the head of the Loch Ness monster...

At the end of last year two commissions disturbed the defense agency's peace. First, members of the parliamentary committee for national security and defense, and then Ministry of Finance auditors. The former visited military units, including a garrison with the proud "Guard" designation. The latter were interested in how the Ministry of Defense leadership disposes of multimillions of budget funds.

The two visits produced two reports, some quotes from which we are offering to the reader with our brief comments.

Deputies: "The low pay of some categories of servicemen (three to four times lower than in Russia); the absence of daily necessities in the commissary; cold apartments because of the dragged-out reconstruction of the garrison boiler house (no financing)—all of this affects servicemen's morale."

Auditors: "The Ministry of Defense transferred budget funds to commercial structures. In the process, contracts were signed make payments to enterprises in Russia and other CIS countries."

Our comments: After the introduction of the tenge at the end of 1993, transferring payments to Russia ceased being a problem. If you have funds in tenge in your account, all you have to do is file a request with the bank, which will purchase hard rubles at the exchange and transfer them to your partners in Russia. The entire operation takes two or three days. Banks charge for their services on average a commission of 1.5 percent of the payment amount.

Let us emphasize: since the end of 1993. The Ministry of Defense, however, probably does not know about it.

Auditors: "In March 1994 the Ministry of Defense transferred 58 million tenge to the account of the judo federation in Almaty. The official explanation was that the aforementioned amounts were transferred in payment to the AO [joint-stock company] Perm Motors for aviation equipment repairs. By the terms of the agreement, 18 percent of the transfer amount, or 10.4 million tenge, were to go to the middleman for services rendered."

Our comments: The 1.5 percent commission on the payment to the Perm repairmen would amount to 870,000 tenge. This is the top price for a bank transfer. Why then did the finance department of our defense agency choose to enrich middlemen with 10 sweet "million?" Lack of experience? But the most interesting part is how the judo businessmen disposed of the "defense" money.

Auditors: "The audit established that the federation converted 57.3 million tenge into foreign currency, and 0.5 million tenge were transferred to various organizations in the capital in payment for goods and services. The currency conversion produced \$1.93 million. Of that, \$1.431 million were transferred to Geneva; \$454,000—to New York, to purchase an oil-mixture separator; and \$700—to Geneva as dues for participation in the Judo World Cup."

It is probably unnecessary to even comment on this. One look at the map will confirm that there is a great distance between Perm and New York.

Deputies: "There are no social guarantees for workers and office workers in the armed forces. The salaries set for them are so low that not all available jobs are filled. Fixed-term servicemen have to be assigned to work in boiler rooms, bath and laundry facilities, and bread bakeries. This negatively affects the training process and the quality of their professional training."

Auditors: "In April 1994 the Ministry of Defense signed a contract with the AO Astra in Pavlodar to transfer payments to Russia. A transfer of 7.8 million tenge was made to Astra, but the firm did not fulfill its obligations. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Defense did not file any claims against it. Instead, another contract was signed—for Astra to deliver 1.5 million tubes of toothpaste in the second quarter of 1994, worth a total of 8 million tenge. The 8 million also were transferred to the AO's account. In fact, Astra delivered only 231,000 tubes of toothpaste, but at prices exceeding the contract price by a factor of two to 2.5. Thus not only was the money transferred in payment for toothpaste "depleted," but also part of the amount received earlier—allegedly for transfer to Russia. As of the date of the audit, the remaining balance owed by Astra to the Ministry of Defense is 1.5 million tenge."

Our comments: The Ministry of Defense's concern about the personal hygiene of commanding and rank-and-file personnel of the armed forces is truly touching. Who would spare the expense of 15.8 million tenge for such a noble goal as achieving an acid-alkali balance in our military? Why not take this trade one step further by purchasing in Geneva sugar-free Orbit or breath fresheners to use on the march? And, of course, at a price inflated several-fold...

Deputies: "Allowances (soap, toothpaste, cigarettes) are not issued to personnel in the quantities specified by the regulations. This is not dealt with in time since there is no supervision on the part of officials. There are instances of bath and laundry facilities being non-operational for lengthy periods of time. The personnel of some military units are affected by pediculosis."

Reference: "PEDICULOSIS is parasitism of head, body, and pubic lice on humans. In instances of head pediculosis, nits firmly attached to hair are detected. Body lice are detected in underwear. Pubic lice are characterized by the presence of nits on the hair in the pubic area, perineum, and less frequently—under the arms and on the body." (Field Medic Manual, Moscow, 1992).

Auditors: "In the summer of 1994 the Ministry of Defense transferred 13.3 million tenge to the account of the AO Shukhur-2 allegedly for making payment to Ukraine for aviation equipment repair. Of this amount, 12.5 million tenge were converted into foreign currency. As a result, the AO received \$280,100, of which \$268,500 were transferred to Dresden-Bank to purchase cosmetics. Of the remaining amount, Shukhur-2 used 550,000 tenge to purchase goods and 200,000 as a partner loan. No money was transferred to Ukraine."

Our comments: Let us allow for the possibility that the Ministry of Defense was simply chronically unlucky and

kept running into questionable, dishonest partners. Then it would be logical to put pressure on them through the arbitration court. But no, the ministry was in no hurry to go to court over lost millions. Is this not because the millions were in a way free, since they came out of our pockets—the pockets of Kazakhstan taxpayers?

Deputies: "Financing for military formations, units, and subunits is not done in a timely manner. The needed amounts are not issued in the full volume. On some expense line items the money allocated comprises 20-50 percent of the needed amount. Such a practice has a negative effect on morale and the psychological state of servicemen and the general level of troops' battle-worthiness."

Auditors: "In April 1994 the Ministry of Defense transferred 15.2 million tenge to the small enterprise Bota—to transfer the money to Ukrainian and Uzbek enterprises. This amount included 2.7 million in late-payment penalties paid by the Ministry of Defense financial services because the ministry did not have the budget funds to make the payment on time. In fact, the Ministry of Defense had the money in its account to pay the amount specified in the contract, and the 'penalty' was paid without any justification."

Our comments: There was a time when penalties were not taxable. Commercial dealers cleverly used this loophole: They bought merchandise at minimal mark-up and

collected the rest from the supplier in the form of fake penalties. In our case the situation is different: The Ministry of Defense apparently was interested in pumping as much budget money as possible into the small enterprise under any guise—not for the purpose of tax evasion.

Deputies: The share of experienced career officers in military career units continues to decline and currently stands at 15-20 percent. Available personnel permits them only to ensure equipment storage. It is impossible to man combat crews to utilize every vehicle. This puts in question the battle-worthiness of some formations and military units."

Auditors: "In March 1994 the Ministry of Defense transferred 112 million tenge to two enterprises—the Agropromstroy association in Korday and the Stepnogorskiy PZ company." The purpose—transfer of payments to Russia. Of the aforementioned amount, the contract stipulated 17.5 percent (19.5 million tenge) to be paid out for middleman services. Four months after receiving the advance, Agropromstroy signed another contract with the Ministry of Defense—for delivery of petroleum products at prices exceeding those of the Munai Onimderi company. At the same time, to the detriment of the budget, the Ministry of Defense ignored the inflation level and the decline in the tenge exchange rate over the period Agropromstroy had free use of budget funds."

ARMS TRADE**Duma Member Urges New Law To Overhaul Export System**

95UM0233A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Jan 95 p 4

[Article by Stepan Sulakshin, chairman of the Subcommittee of the State Duma on Problems of Development of the Military-Industrial Complex, under the rubric "Military-Technical Cooperation": "Russia Produces Competitive Armament and Has No Law Regulating Its Export"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Attention is on Chechnya everywhere. But the Chechen situation makes it possible to see other painful Russian problems, like under a magnifying glass.

A number of newspapers and television and radio broadcasts are circulating the comments of Pentagon experts who "are closely following the actions of the Russian Army in the zone of combat operations. They are struck by the ineffectiveness and vulnerability of Russian tanks and armored equipment..."

It would seem this is indeed the case. However, at least two conclusions follow from this. The first is that the country never can realize its own state, nationwide interests. The second is a paradoxical one. Russian armored equipment is not all that bad! Let us examine

this and help some of the Russian mass media work for their own country and not for its competitors in the world markets, one of which is the arms and military equipment market.

So, they talk about the supposedly poor quality of Russian equipment, but...they do not say that the tanks and armored personnel carriers were operating in extreme, unprecedented conditions. They do not say that the coordination of armored equipment, long-range artillery and artillery systems, and aviation was organized not out of the interests of optimal tactics of the troop operation, one of the goals of which is to minimize friendly losses, but out of considerations for reducing casualties among the peaceful residents in the part of the city captured by the fighters, out of political considerations. Aviation and artillery in many cases were simply "left out" of coordination. The Russian grouping could have avoided losing a single tank if it would have used all of its firepower and simply removed the city from the face of the earth. But this could not be done, and that is why the Russian soldier dies and the Russian tank burned.

Incidentally, why didn't the Pentagon experts, and certain naive Russia mass media after them, still praise the Russian weapons used in the antitank combat. After all, the Dudayev "victories" were won by Russian weapons!

But let us look at the figures. In 1989-1992, the structure of world export deliveries was such according to data from THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

Structure of World Export Deliveries

Country	Fighters	Tanks	Helicopters	Ships	Missiles
USA	917	4,948	848	33	484
England, France, FRG	216	1,046	139	63	797
Russia	231	515	55	11	12
China	283	191	-	2	63

It follows from these data that Russia is really competitive with European and American producers when it comes to tanks. Despite all the negative economic processes taking place in recent years, the prestige of Russian weapons is still very high. This is shown by the results of international arms exhibits, where we demonstrated the MIG-29, Su-27, Mi-28 and Ka-50 helicopters, T-80 and BMP-3 armored equipment, "Smerch" and "Tor" artillery systems, S-300 air defense systems, and so forth. That means they must run down Russian equipment in order for the competition to be more successful.

As a power, Russia at last needs to be concerned about preserving and maintaining the quality of its arms, including their export versions. In any case, it must not make itself an anti-advertisement. It is sad to talk

about this, but the country's scientific-technological and industrial potential is simply being killed before our eyes by the present economic policy.

If we are truly concerned about the future of the defense sector, we need to regulate the mechanisms of military-technical cooperation with foreign countries, including at the level of doctrine, legislation, and state bodies controlling military exports, and stop incurring billions of dollars in losses.

In conditions of the overall decline in the world arms trade in the late 1980's and early 1990's and the exclusion of Russia from traditional markets, the country must increase its foreign policy, marketing, and organizational efforts to protect its interests in these markets.

Reduction of the Army is resulting in huge reserves of "excess" weapons, a large part of which are obsolete by European standards, but would be quite suitable for other regions already having Russian military equipment.

In today's crisis economic situation, the sale of weapons often turns into the only source for supporting the enterprise itself for the duration of the economic problems (this period of economic self-consumption must end) and for real conversion and dual technologies.

The question of whether or not Russia needs to trade in weapons was long ago removed from the agenda; life itself answered it quite definitely. There is another question. How to do this successfully and most effectively?

The system of state control of the import and export of weapons and military equipment and providing services in the area of military-technical cooperation with foreign countries was subjected to a substantial restructuring in recent years. New elements of control have been created, and their tasks and functions have been defined more specifically. The system of control of military-technical cooperation can be presented as divided into six levels: the President of the Russian Federation, the government, the State Committee for Military-Technical Policy, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, commercial organizations for trading in weapons and services (special exporters), and arms producers.

Given all what would seem to be logic, the cumbersome nature of the system is striking. Not everything is going smoothly; a mass of problems arise, the solution of which is very complicated in view of the weakness of the executive power and the constant pressure on the part of the various participants in military-technical cooperation, and sometimes also leads to negative consequences.

Two directly opposite trends are encountered in organizing an integrated state mechanism of military exports. On the one side, we have centralization and monopolization of control of exports. On the other, life demands greater dynamics, efficiency, and interest, above all, of enterprises producing military equipment. That is why the monopoly "Rosvozrucheniye" State Company, which has already had time to undergo inspections and reorganizations, and the State Committee of the Russian Federation for Military-Technical Policy (Edict of the President of the Russian Federation of 30 December 1994) were created. That is why the Governmental Decree of 6 May 1994 "On Granting Enterprises the Right To Participate in the

Russian Federation's Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign Countries" was issued. What was the result?

Relations are intensely being built between industrial enterprises, the Army, and weapons traders. The functions of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the Ministry of Defense, and industrial and exporting organizations are often duplicated. A huge number of small intermediaries, having nothing to do with the defense industry and only damaging our prestige, continue to operate. It is an amusing incident when 18 different domestic intermediaries—among which were also physical persons—showed up in Malaysia when it came to signing a contract for delivery of MIG-29 aircraft.

Parliamentary hearings held by us in the State Duma on problems of military-technical cooperation shed light on difficult problems and highlighted the large losses which Russia continues to incur. Thus, Russia is losing about \$4 billion just due to the continuing lack of regulation of military-technical cooperation with Pakistan, for example. This is given all the necessary foreign policy mechanisms of regional balance, balance of Russia's interests in relations with India, and so forth. This is how we are competing in the arms markets and are concerned about promoting the same T-72, T-80, and BMP-3 armored equipment, MIG-29 and Su-27 aircraft, and other armament in these markets.

We do not have a law that would regulate in the country's interests questions of military-technical cooperation, cooperation in other industrial spheres, and in expanding Russia's zones of influence and prestige. The State Duma's plans for legislation list a draft law on military-technical cooperation with foreign countries. However, not all is well here, either. The legislative initiative is being dragged out on the part of the subject of such a law—the government of Russia. And it seems that the State Duma Committee for Defense, on whom the fate of the draft law depends directly, is sometimes more concerned about political activity and press conferences than work on specific draft legislation.

It seems that dragging out the passage of a law on military-technical cooperation works against the interests of Russian industry and Russia itself. Those in the State Duma who are responsible for legislation on problems of the military-industrial complex intend to make every effort to see that a law on military-technical cooperation is passed in 1995.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY & CONVERSION**Statistics Chief Gives Industry Overview for 1994**

*95UM0234B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Jan 95 p 3*

[Article by Vitaliy Vitebskiy, chief of the Russian Committee on the Defense Industry Main Information and Statistics Administration, under the rubric: "Statistics": "The Military-Industrial Complex in 1994"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The RF Committee on the Defense Industry has summed up the preliminary results for 1994. What are the main results?

First of all, December consolidated the trend toward stabilization that began in September. The level of this

stabilization is approximately 40% of the 1991 level of production. Obviously, this is the defense industry's survival boundary. Further is either target-directed growth or a collapse associated with massive production stoppages and the bankruptcy of enterprises.

The 1994 annual production volume was 61.4% of the 1993 level.

The overall dynamics of State Committee production volumes with regard to 1991 correspond to our forecast. For three years, the defense product production volume has been reduced by more than a factor of five and civilian production has been reduced by nearly a factor of two.

Dynamics of Production Volumes in the State Committee in Percentages of the 1991 Production Volume

	1991	1992	1993	1994
GP [Civilian Production]	100	99.6	85.6	52.6
VP [Military Production]	100	80.4	64.6	39.2
Total	100	49.5	32.5	19.9

Recent months' results indicate that a number of concrete decisions, first of all, normalization of the state order and its financing, are required to prevent total disruption of complex operations.

Second, the reduction of the number of personnel working in the military-industrial complex is continuing: in November, in contrast to November 1993, it was reduced on the whole by 17 percent (including in industry—by 18.1 percent). A comparison of these figures with production volume reduction indicators shows the accumulating potential of hidden unemployment.

Third, the process continues of the increasing lag of the defense industry worker pay level behind other sectors. According to the State Committee, the average monthly wage in November on the whole was 198,000 rubles.

Information: in November, the average monthly wage totaled R281,600 in the national economy, R310,600 in industry and, R227,800 in machine building.

The lowest wage level is in electronics industry enterprises (R138,100) and the highest—is in the shipbuilding industry (R274,200). In the process, we need to bear in mind that these wages are being paid with chronic delays and therefore are being substantially "consumed" by inflation.

The rates of price increases rose in the fourth quarter, especially in December. The overall index of price increases with regard to December 1993 was 5.6 for industry's defense sector products (including 5.0 for civilian products).

All types of defense sector budget financing, including payment of the state defense order, were executed at 64.5 percent of the prescribed budget. The state's debts for production that was produced according to its order totaled R1.5 trillion. This is a substantial portion of total incurred debt. According to preliminary data, based upon its size, it is one third larger than the enterprises' salary debts to workers and employees.

Based upon the situation in industry's defense sectors on January 1, 1995, the Federal Administration for Insolvency (Bankruptcy) Affairs under Russia's State Committee on the Administration of State Property has been declared insolvent and as having an unsatisfactory structure of the balance of 158 enterprises, scientific research institutes and design bureaus. The cases of eight of them have been reviewed in courts of arbitration (external management has been appointed at four).

Decisions have been made to privatize 64.7 percent of the State Committee on the Defense Industry's enterprises and organizations that are subject to privatization.

At the present time, the lack of decisions on paying off the debt for the state order, the outcome of reciprocal nonpayments, the state order for 1995, and financing for other budget items makes the prospects for the first quarter quite pessimistic and places in question the possibility of preserving minimal stability in the defense complex.

Experts Comment on Defense Conversion Problem

95UM0234A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Jan 95 p 4

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Aleksandr Babakin, under the rubric: "Symposiums, Conferences and Seminars": "Conversion—Myths and Reality"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russians had pinned their hopes on retooling the country's defense complex. It was thought that the military-industrial complex was capable of filling the Russian market with diverse national economic products instead of super-modern weaponry. However, this did not occur. What is more, Russia's military-industrial complex itself has turned out to be in a very difficult position—many unique factories, scientific-research centers and design bureaus have been closed, and hundreds of thousands of people are unemployed. What are the causes of the military-industrial complex's current disastrous situation? Is there a way out of the deep economic crisis that has seized literally all sectors of the defense industry? These and other issues were discussed at the all-Russian conference that was conducted on January 17-19 in Moscow. The conference was organized with the support of the RF State Committee of the Defense Industry, the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, the Independent Women's Forum Information Center, the "Realists" Club, the "Conversion and Women" Association, the Russian Peace and Harmony Committee, and the Russian Peace Fund. We offer the opinions of some of the conference participants for your attention.

Mikhail Maley—chairman of the RF Security Council Interdepartmental Commission for Defense Industry Scientific-Technical Issues.

Today the military-industrial complex is hundreds of enterprises, design bureaus and scientific research institutes, behind each of which stands a large number of factories from other sectors of the country's national economy. And if, for example, a plant that produces electronic circuit cards has closed, that automatically results in halting the production of televisions, another complex product. Of course, this cannot be done. However, conversion programs were not even 10 percent fulfilled in 1993 and, in my view, in general there wasn't any conversion in 1994. Many cheap and reliable Russian goods that the defense industry produced simply disappeared from the shelves of our stores. Today, one can correct the state of affairs in the defense complex only by taking energetic steps for state support of converted enterprises. Only in that case will we be able to rapidly transfer the defense industry to the civilian track with minimal losses.

Aleksey Shulunov—chairman of the League for Assistance to Defense Enterprises.

More than a dozen federal conversion programs have been developed: the development of civil aviation, electronics, medicine and others. But the state did not provide proper financing for them.

Right now, very much depends on the director corps and on the initiative of the collectives themselves. Under new conditions, we need to more boldly seek points for the application of efforts and accurately predict the economic situation in the country. But the state is also obliged to provide substantial assistance to converted enterprises. For example, the appropriate law has been adopted which states that an enterprise is notified about conversion two years in advance. That is quite a bit of time to retool production and to resolve social issues. But this provision is being systematically violated. And, the law on conversion will not operate in and of itself. The people who are implementing it are, putting it mildly, not performing their duties. So now the time has come to put things in elementary order on this issue.

Vladimir Andreyev—section chief of Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast Administration Conversion and Military-Industrial Affairs Administration.

We had to set up 800 types of civilian products in accordance with the oblast enterprise conversion program for 1993-1995 that was developed by our experts. At the present time, we are already producing 500. That occurred thanks to the conversion program management and implementation mechanisms that were created in a timely manner. Specifically, the Conversion Affairs Administration, the Nizhniy Novgorod Bankers' Club, a special conversion promotion fund, an oblast investment council for assessment of converted projects, and the Volgo-Vyatskiy Conversion Center were created and state status has now been attached to the Nizhniy Novgorod Trade Fair. These and other measures permit the conduct of real conversion at numerous defense enterprises in one region.

Zinoviy Tsak, director of Lyuberetskiy's "Soyuz" NPO [Scientific-Production Association], Vladimir Kirillovych, chief designer of TsKB [Central Design Bureau] AO [Joint-Stock Company] for Hydrofoils from Nizhniy Novgorod, and other participants also spoke at the seminar. Practically everyone spoke about the fact that the former elite defense sectors of our industry are practically collapsing, valuable specialists are leaving for other structures, plant and institute corps are emptying, and unemployment has encompassed entire industrial cities. So, defense enterprises are in dire need of powerful state support for the conduct of full-fledged conversion. Only in that case will reliable, good quality, diverse goods appear on the shelves of Russian stores.

Miass Missile Center Designer on Industry Development

95UM0228A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian
25 Jan 95 p 9

[Article by "Nekos" Agency Correspondent Vladimir Gubarev, under the rubric: "Experts": "Opinions: General Designer Igor Velichko: 'We Are Looking for New Paths Into Space'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Since time immemorial, Miass has been considered to be the "golden city" of the Urals. Here each resident knew how to pan for gold and working people from every corner of the country congregated here in hopes of striking it rich... Illusions have been destroyed by reality and yet Miass has always remained with gold. And today a dredge operates on the outskirts of the city and they point it out to guests with pride.

The 20th Century has brought new glory to Miass. First of all "Ural" all-terrain motor vehicles and now missiles. The curtain of secrecy has been opened slightly and we have learned that the State Missile Center imeni Academician V.P. Makeyev is located here where powerful missile systems are developed for nuclear submarines.

[Gubarev] The unknown missile center—that's what they call you. Was there a need for such "deep" secrecy?

[Velichko] We weren't involved with space but it was space that brought us fame. Our mission was to develop military systems and, if you approach the problem of secrecy from that point of view, then secrecy is justified. And believe me, right now it is urgent. No matter how much you talk about disarmament, glasnost, or permissiveness, nevertheless state secrets exist and there are quite a few of them within the walls of our state center. The confrontation between the United States and the USSR in the sphere of strategic offensive weapons began immediately after the development of nuclear weapons, both on land and at sea. Responsibility for the development of missile systems for submarines lay on the shoulders of the design bureau headed by Viktor Petrovich Makeyev. And the fact that the collective managed to not only maintain the balance but at times to even outstrip similar U.S. weapons in some parameters certainly was an outstanding contribution of Academician Makeyev and his comrades in arms and subcontractors who worked together with the "Machine Building Design Bureau," as our State Missile Center was previously called.

[Gubarev] This sphere of missile building was always "terra incognita." Could you briefly discuss the primary stages of its development?

[Velichko] In 1954, research began of the methods to employ ballistic missiles from submarines. In the United States, this was the Jupiter missile and in the USSR the R-11 operational-tactical missile. Academician Sergey Pavlovich Korolev, who "transferred" this direction to his Student Victor Petrovich Makeyev, was at the origin of this work. He headed the design bureau in the Urals in 1955. It is at this time that the submarine missile development strategy was determined. Because the Americans had not managed to solve a series of problems with the "liquid" variant, they rejected the Jupiter and shifted to the Polaris program which utilized solid fuel. In our country, progress in liquid missile engines was more substantial. The first launch of the R-11 FM ballistic missile from a submarine occurred on September 16, 1955.

'We have proposed a 'space interceptor' project to the world community. If the idea is supported, we are prepared to begin its implementation so that we can completely protect our planet from random occurrences already at the beginning of the 21st Century.'

[Gubarev] And the competition between the USSR and the United States began?

[Velichko] The Cold War was going on and it determined many things. Our first generation naval missile systems lagged behind American systems. This was associated with the general lag of missiles and the economy as a whole. We also lagged behind in firing range, the basic load of ammunition on a submarine, navigation and firing accuracy. Already by 1964, 18 submarines were operating in the United States and they made up the foundation of the U.S. strategic forces... With the development of the second generation, we managed to eliminate the gap and lag, although both sides had their specific features. Specifically, we had at our disposal missile systems with intercontinental firing range and a single warhead and the United States had medium range missiles with a MIRVed warhead. It is very often asserted that we "built up the might of submarines faster than the Americans". That is incorrect. It is sufficient to cite these figures. In 1960, the United States had 48 missile systems and just as many warheads on them and we had a total of 15. Ten years later—656 nuclear warheads and 300, respectively. In 1990, the U.S. nuclear submarine fleet had 5,440 warheads in the inventory and we had 2,761. I think that from here it is easy to arrive at the conclusion about who led in the arms race... The development of third generation missile systems began at the beginning of the 1970's. Both the USSR and the United States made a "technological breakthrough" in this sphere and the results obtained were comparable. Therefore, a strategic balance was established between our countries and now it is a question of strengthening strategic stability. All of the problems associated with the development of Russia's

submarine-launched ballistic missiles were resolved under the leadership of Academician Makeyev. Our center was the leader in that direction.

[Gubarev] I know that Viktor Petrovich won several "battles" with the country's highest leadership while defending its direction?

[Velichko] He was not only a brilliant organizer and designer but he was a staunch, persistent man. Along with his colleagues, he defined the main goal and then as Chief Designer defended the overall decision. This didn't always succeed but quite often Makeyev knew how to convince both his opponents and the highest leadership. In his memoirs, he relates a curious episode associated with a Defense Council session in 1964. This is how Viktor Petrovich described it: "For us, this year was historic, having caused quite a few trials and tribulations. In that year, just like in 1959, we once again had to take our chances. Quite unexpectedly for us, another design bureau—TsKBM (Maritime Central Design Bureau) (Chief Designer V.N. Chelomey) developed proposals, besides our technical proposals, for the new development of the complex. This was a very powerful design bureau with outstanding experimental facilities. The question, to whom, in the final analysis, to entrust this development, was decided at a responsible session under Chairman N.S. Khrushchev. V.N. Chelomey was the first to deliver a report. It turned out in such a way that the issue was essentially predetermined and my report already did not make sense. Nevertheless, the report was delivered and, to general surprise, N.S. Khrushchev said that he much preferred KBM's proposals. This also determined the principal developer. We once again became the principal developer. The decree on the development of the systems was adopted in 1964. Krasnoyarsk Machine Building Plant was determined to be the principal plant. V.P. Kotelnikov was designated director of the plant. Only God and we know how much effort and health went into the development of this system. Already in the village of Nenoksa where the Northern Naval Test Range was located and where Makeyev arrived, he said that after the reports Khrushchev added: "Chelomey's proposals are good but I prefer Makeyev. See how the pioneer has grown!" The fact is that still prior to the war when Khrushchev was first secretary of the Moscow Party City Committee, he arrived at the aircraft plant in Filyakh. During a triumphal meeting, then Vitya Makeyev tied a pioneer's tie on him. Nikita Sergeyevich had fond memories of that... It is curious that Stalin also unintentionally played a definite role in Makeyev's fate. Viktor Petrovich worked at the Komsomol central committee and was a member of the delegation at the Olympiad in Helsinki. After our soccer team's loss, Stalin ordered everyone who led the delegation be fired. Makeyev then left the Komsomol and was no longer involved in

public activity. He returned to "Korolev's firm". Without Stalin's order, Viktor Petrovich's fate could have turned out differently...

[Gubarev] Did they sometimes call Makeyev a "lucky person" and did they say that your design bureau was very lucky?

[Velichko] Viktor Petrovich sometimes quoted Korolev who said: "If you make things rapidly but poorly, everyone will soon forget that you made things rapidly but they will long remember that you made things poorly." And that is why the collective did not have the right to work like that. Bear in mind that Makeyev was surrounded by very talented scientists and designers, especially in the Urals region. The fact that the systems developed here did not lag behind American systems became possible largely thanks to the productive cooperation of two centers—missile and nuclear that are located side by side. I have in mind Miass and Chelyabinsk-70. And also the wonderful contacts between Urals Academicians Yevgeniy Ivanovich Zababakhin and Viktor Petrovich Makeyev who were unknown in broad circles. Of course, cooperation continues between their scientists and comrades in arms... So, before we talk about "luck", we need to recall the difficult work, the searches, the failures and the new searches.

[Gubarev] And yet, did Makeyev sometimes lose? I have in mind the story about the development of solid fuel missiles?

[Velichko] "Failure"—That isn't the word! In the final analysis, these systems were developed and the State Center imeni Academician Makeyev was once again the principal organization. The essence is something else. Viktor Petrovich was convinced that there was no need to develop these systems. He thought that enormous resources would be required to deploy a new sphere of industry and to create enterprises, test stands and so forth. And that's what happened. They jokingly said that we are faced with a "hard political line". This decision was made "at the very top" and it was thought that if the Americans had solid fuel missiles then we had to have them. Makeyev was convinced: "We will lose much time and resources for no reason. The advantage from it in combat utilization will be ephemeral. The country's political leadership needs the system to deter the probable enemy and here arguments and calculations are futile."

[Gubarev] And yet he agreed?

[Velichko] There was no other solution. This was an order. Of course, they could have tasked another design bureau to develop the missile systems but "Makeyev's firm" carried out this project with the least expenditures and with greater effectiveness... So,

today when some people talk about the "insatiability of the defense industry," they are profoundly deceived: sober and realistically thinking people who took the country's capabilities into account always worked in the military-industrial complex, in contrast to many political leaders. This is not a vote of approval but the facts. I know very well that our neighbors—the nuclear weapons people—very often opposed the expansion of the products list of their "items" but, unfortunately that opinion was often not heeded. In the end, the appropriate order or government instruction was issued and they carried it out as state people. The missile builders also did.

[Gubarev] We have reached conversion... This is a logical continuation of the conversation, isn't it?

[Velichko] There are enough errors and primitivism with conversion... It is quite natural that they also affected the State Missile Center. We are the primary developer of equipment to produce children's food. We have designed systems to produce canned goods, pate and sausages in a long-term storage sleeve. We are developing equipment to process agricultural raw materials for farms and the food industry, food packaging, and loading and unloading operations. Our State Center is designing the "Spektr" tram car that should replace Czech cars. We are also developing various medical equipment—bathing equipment, diagnostic and physical therapy devices and other equipment.

[Gubarev] The list is impressive but why isn't there optimism?

[Velichko] That type of "conversion" is probably necessary but it cannot provide the State Missile Center and its collective with the needed devices and, the main thing, with creative work in that sphere where we occupy the leading position. I think that it's clear to everyone that Russia needs a submarine fleet that is equipped with modern missile systems. But then why are resources for defense work being allocated so irregularly?! There's no use hiding it. The chief designer has to go to Moscow not to discuss weapons problems at the Kremlin, the White House or Ministry of Defense but to dislodge money for salaries... And we need another conversion, that which will raise the country to a new level and we can be monopolists on the world market and earn an enormous income. Of course, assistance is needed and, not resources, but the Russian leadership's interest in this type of conversion.

[Gubarev] Examples, please?

[Velichko] The Makeyev Design Bureau was not previously involved with space. It's possible that this is one of the mistakes of the past. We will not judge... But we did not direct attention to the possibility of utilizing military missile technologies for peaceful purposes.

There are the "Zyb" and "Volna" launch vehicles. After minor reequipping, they can be utilized for the vertical launch of special rescue units. Micro gravity conditions are created in 17-30 minutes. This is entirely adequate to obtain certain materials under conditions of weightlessness and to purify certain medicines.

[Gubarev] Three launches of the "Zyb" rocket have taken place from a submarine—as experiments on materials technology and biotechnology. The results that were obtained are quite interesting and they permit us to talk about commerce. We are prepared to place a series of "Volna" rockets on the market that will permit the increase of the time of experiments in space. Isn't this conversion?

[Velichko] But are there more "exotic" projects?

[Gubarev] Certainly. Do you have in mind "Aerokosmos" and "Priboy"? These projects are real and are implementable already in the near future. This is a question of mobile launch platforms for which cosmodromes are not needed. You can launch objects into space from any point of the World Ocean or from an aircraft. The cost of these launches into space is significantly cheaper than customary launches. Incidentally, the idea of "maritime" launches into space was born in the United States, however, they could not implement it there. But it became a reality at Miass—this fact already attests to the capabilities of the State Missile Center Imeni V.P. Makeyev.

[Velichko] And what do you have in the future?

[Gubarev] We have in reserve another series of original projects that are based on the technologies of submarine missile systems. Perhaps I will mention one more thing—about the defense of the Earth from dangerous space objects—comets and asteroids. The danger of a collision between them and the Earth is high and right now there are real possibilities to avoid that. We have proposed a "space interceptor" project to the world community. If the idea is supported, we are prepared to begin its implementation so that we can completely protect our planet from random occurrences already at the beginning of the 21st Century.

[Velichko] Do I sense that you look to the future with optimism?

[Gubarev] Over the decades, the Makeyev Design Bureau collective has overcome enormous difficulties and has done this successfully. Indeed, previously they were of a technical nature, right now they are different... But science has always lived with hope and confidence in the future. Just like those people who are involved with that. Our confidence is in common sense.

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

US Blamed for Start of Arms Race

95UM0175A Moscow ZAVTRA in Russian
No 50, Dec 94 p 4

[Article by Vladimir Titov: "Don't Shoot at the Pianist..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] The people primarily to blame for the world arms race are the directors of Soviet Defense enterprises, I heard for the first time in the late 1970's at a lecture at the Moscow Aviation Institute. The instructor, proud of his knowledgeability, told the students how one of the chief designers made an excellent mobile medium-range missile. Ustinov accepted it into service, and the United States is now packing Europe with its Pershing-2 and cruise missiles. Although he was knowledgeable only in a narrow area of confrontation between the superpowers, which did not give a complete understanding of the motivation of the politicians making some or other decision, the aura of a certain free-thinking, unfamiliar to young students of the natural sciences, far from the dissident pseudop-elite, made them pay attention to his words. Therefore, now, after so many turns and upsets, the seeming sharpness of the topic stated by Vl. Marusin does not outrage me.

Of course, the leaders of the military-industrial complex are not angels and cannot be. In the struggle for orders, they had to scheme, using gentlemanly market methods of competition familiar to American corporations, but not mentioned in textbooks on the political economy of socialism. These are: unfounded advertisement of their products; discrediting the equipment of competitors; lobbying their interests at the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers; frequent repeating of information about the real—as Vl. Marusin, offended at Russia "plodding along at the tail of the world community," does not want to consider it imaginary—American military threat.

Academicians and general directors have tried with all their might to do what they know how to do best of all—produce military equipment. It is just as improper to accuse them of lacking love for Russia and disregarding its interests as it is to require a 100-percent successful flight in the first testing of a new missile. Test launches are needed so that the complex system ceases to be simply a collection of parts and calculated variants of their interaction and is turned into a reliable combat tool. Accidental or unauthorized launches are equally the norm for ranges in the United States and Russian, England and China. Even the Germans, sticklers for detail, did not consider the explosions of the first FAU's to be a trend. It is easy for a candidate of sciences from electronics, who has

become accustomed to pondering "ways and meanings," to feel like a "scoop"—this is evidenced by the quotation marks which the author places around the words nuclear missile shield. It is easy after the newspaper and television stereotype to repeat that the military-industrial complex has eaten away 80 percent of the gross national product, that the torpedoes and missiles of our submarines strike only in daylight, but not the target. It is easy to consider Russia impoverished, having become a drunkard and unprotected because of greedy heroes of socialist labor. But just how accurate does this black-and-white flat picture relay our colored three-dimensional reality?

What was created during those same years in the United States—a model of a rational approach to military-technical policy, a standard of economic expediency? It must be admitted that the first atomic bomb was born in America, that humane capitalists and not terrible communists used this monstrous weapon against living people, and without any military necessity, that the American Senate passed the Law on Enslaved Peoples, which proclaimed a state goal of the United States to be destruction of the USSR, that the directors of the military-industrial complex are tired of all the time catching up with the "world community" regarding the creation of new weapons—and it is to their credit and praise that we beggars behind the "Iron Curtain" could show up the rich Yankees at least in something.

Speaking of the quality of weapons and economy in creating them, let us recall that the first nuclear-powered submarine that sunk was American, that the Lockheed Starfires, accepted into service almost throughout the "Free World" thanks to bribes, fell on its cities in good working condition, earning the legitimate nickname of "flying coffin" among pilots, and that Stealth and SDI are considered the most expensive and useless military-technical programs. The completely failed technology of "invisible" aircraft, which Russian radars still see, and the idea of "Star Wars," today hastily given a new face of intercepting operational-tactical missiles—these are huge successes of exclusively the American mass media and military-industrial complex, creating for the weapons an image of being invincible.

When the hundreds of billions in spending were approved for the Stealth project, is it possible American experts did not know that the whole civilized world had switched to millimeter-band radar, but the backward Soviet Union still kept, out of economic incompetence (or political wisdom), a whole axis of long-wave radar—you will laugh, candidates of sciences—at the Gorkiy Television Plant imeni Lenin. And now making use of the U.S. super aviation is like getting blood from a stone.

In untwisting the SDI ideology, the Americans again tried to become invulnerable, only no longer in victorious wars with banana republics, but on the brink of military confrontation with a superpower possessing intercontinental cluster missiles with individually guided warheads. When it became clear even to senators and congressmen that there was nothing for them to catch against Russian strategic missiles, they began to modify the program. A protective system with a Patriot missile was declared to be wonderful protection against the ancient Russian medium-range missiles called Scuds in the West, which are now in service in dozens of countries. Television relished the scenes of direct hits by Patriots against missiles launched by the Iraqis against Israel and Kuwait, but specialists from both sides understood that—only three hits in a row are capable of destroying a warhead and not simply chopping off the platform's engine that has already finished working. As a result, Saddam hit where he wanted, the American military scratched their heads, pondering "How to guide an antiballistic-missile missile if the warhead is separating or the platform is sensitive and more modern?" and the manufacturers offer the Patriot left and right, good and truth in the last instance in the "Free World," and now the Russian intellectuals have the mass media. But the Russian military and directors of the military-industrial complex modestly demonstrate the S-300 antiaircraft system at exercises, hitting a tactical missile three times in a row, and no one explains why three times? A specialist would understand, but it is forbidden by someone to tell the "world community" through the mass media.

One should not get uptight over the informal ties of general designers and generals; hysterics are not needed about "devastating" projects—this is not an economic, but an ideological approach. A real economist knows that a partial economic effect shows nothing, but no one knows how to calculate a complete one. What is national security and who has made what kind of a contribution to strengthening it or to its breakdown? It is impossible to clear up this question without war. Our submarines are bad or wonderful; one can say firmly only after a full-scale nuclear catastrophe. I do not know if it was worth spending billions of rubles in the 1970's. Was it worth exhausting [our country] during industrialization on the threshold of the War II? History does not know the subjunctive mood. Maybe someone likes administrative officials or commanders of UN "peacekeeping" forces more than the president's representatives—this is no reason to declare that scientists and organizers of production of Russian military equipment are to blame for Russia's humiliated position.

Reorganization of Chinese Army Air Defense

95UM01904 Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 10, Oct 94 pp 25-27

[Article by Colonel Ye. Velichko: "Reorganization of Chinese Ground Forces PVO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The formations for the air defense [PVO] of the ground forces of China are part of the national PVO system, along with the manpower and equipment of the air¹ and naval forces and the so-called "people's PVO," which performs civil-defense functions. It is a relatively new branch of the service, since it was detached from the field artillery in the middle of the 1980s. The necessity for that was dictated by the continuous rise in the role of means of aerial attack in carrying out tasks in an operation or battle, changes in their structure, and the appearance of new types of weapons delivery.

The combat capabilities of PVO manpower and equipment have increased considerably since that time, owing to the rise in the proportionate share of air-defense artillery in the composition of field formations—first at the division level, and then at the army. The total number of anti-aircraft artillery weapons in formations and large units had increased by roughly 1.5 times by the end of the 1980s, which made it possible for a division to cover up to 80-90 percent of all of the zones it occupied in defense. The capabilities for covering lethal zones, as well as simultaneous firing on aerial targets, increased by 2—3 times therein. The quantitative growth in air-defense artillery paralleled the entry into service of anti-aircraft artillery systems using new and modernized means of detection and fire control. The Miao-6, -8 and -11 fire-control radars in particular were employed in 37mm air-defense artillery systems and the Jing-17, as well as types 582 and 572, on 57mm systems. Self-propelled air-defense gun mounts began entering service with the ground forces. The work to create SAM systems for various purposes was also made more active; their deployment was expected in the first half of the 1990s.

The question of developing new principles and provisions for the combat application of the resources of the field PVO of the NOAK [Chinese People's Liberation Army] arose simultaneously with its technical improvement, with a regard for the prospects for equipping it with contemporary types of weapons and military hardware, as well as the increased complexity of the nature of the aerial threat.

The primary attention was directed toward the incorporation of the principle of zone coverage for the troops on the battlefield into the practices of organization and application of field PVO manpower and

equipment. In the opinion of Chinese specialists, it meets the increasingly complicated conditions of battle, with its modern means of aerial attack and the necessity of covering an increased number of targets on the battlefield to the greatest extent. Specialists note, at the same time, that the prevailing level of sophistication of field PVO in weaponry and military hardware and its capabilities for controlling them in battle are exceedingly limited, and allows use of the principle of zone coverage only in main sectors. This will require the creation of their own system of command and control for the field PVO forces, based largely on combining it with the command-and-control elements of field artillery. Chinese military specialists assume that the introduction of zone coverage for the troops at the level of the combined-arms formation or army will have to be subordinated to centralized command-and-control for up to ½ of the regular and attached forces of the air-defense missile troops, and up to ½ of all air-defense artillery.

Several approaches to the creation of groups of PVO forces in a combined-arms formation in various types of army operations were tried out in the course of various exercises, in order to practice questions of the organization of zone coverage. Based on the results, it was deemed expedient to concentrate further inquiry and research on studying a conceptual framework for uniting heterogeneous PVO forces into various dedicated groups. All of the PVO manpower and equipment in an army zone, for example, were subdivided under one variation into a group to cover the primary zone, and groups for direct and mobile coverage. The group covering the primary zone, in the evaluation of Chinese specialists, should comprise medium- and short-range air-defense missile systems, as well as anti-aircraft artillery, including small-caliber. This group, as a rule, would be created on the basis of an army PVO brigade.

Direct support groups (two or three) are expected to be used principally for the protection of the positions and positional areas of the missile troops and artillery. Their composition is expected to include no fewer than two battalions of medium- and short-range SAM systems, as well as subunits of anti-aircraft artillery, including self-propelled. Mobile cover groups (three or more) will be employed for the protection of mobile targets, including command-and-control points, and reserves against air strikes. They will be created on the basis of close-range SAM systems and small-caliber artillery subunits.

Chinese specialist feel that forward and mobile PVO formations, combining the capabilities of zone and target coverage, could be a second variation for the organization of PVO. The forward units are to be created from subunits of the anti-aircraft artillery

regiments in the first echelon and close-range SAM systems (primarily PZRKs [portable SAM systems]) that are part of the division PVO assets, and the mobile ones on the basis of units from army and division assets, primarily AA guns and close-range SAM systems. The target-coverage group includes one or two battalions of anti-aircraft artillery, as well as some medium- and short-range SAM systems transferred for reinforcement. The area coverage group is created on the basis of an army PVO brigade, as well as some of the divisional assets and medium-range SAM systems of the higher commander. It may be composed, as noted, of 12–14 battalions.

The experience of exercises, in the opinion of Chinese military specialists, confirms the possibility of converting to a new standard organizational structure for field PVO in the future that is connected with the introduction of the PVO brigades into the army/front echelon.

Battalions of 37mm anti-aircraft guns from the anti-aircraft artillery regiments of the divisions are expected to be positioned close to the positions of the first-echelon artillery groups of the regiments at intervals of 4–5 km when organizing divisional PVO. This will provide an opportunity to fire across a front of 13–14 km, which conforms as a whole to the width of the divisional operational zone. The required depth of coverage will be provided by a battalion of 57mm guns drawn back 6 km from the 37mm gun battalions. The placement of Hongqi-61 SAM system batteries in the intervals between them will also create a depth of anti-aircraft fire of up to 18 km, which will correspond by and large to the depth of the battle formations of a division on attack or on defense. Chinese specialists assume that this will provide direct cover not only for the most important elements of the battle formations, but for the entire divisional operational zone as well.

The combat capabilities of PVO in the regimental zone are planned to be increased through a centralization of command-and-control of the available forces, based on the creation of a PVO battalion out of the regular anti-aircraft artillery batteries of the regiments and the anti-aircraft machinegun platoons of the motorized-infantry battalions. That organization, with a regard for the positioning of the 37mm anti-aircraft artillery pieces a distance of 1,000–1,500 meters from the forward line and the anti-aircraft machinegun platoons on the flanks of the battle formations, should provide for the successful waging of battle with enemy army aviation.

The further reorganization of the forces of field PVO, as shown by a study of the views of Chinese military specialists, is proceeding as a whole with the closely linked accomplishment of two tasks—the pursuit of a purposeful technical policy for the further supply of

this branch of the troops with new weaponry and hardware, and the tryout of methods and forms for their combat application in order to raise the combat capabilities of the ground forces PVO of the NOAK.

Footnote

1. See ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE No. 9, 1993, pp 37-42.—Ed.

SECURITY SERVICES

UN Peacekeeping in Modern Era

95UM0189A Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 10, Oct 94 pp 2-6

[Article by Colonel V. Ivanov and Major A. Grinenko under the rubric "Common Problems": "Contemporary UN Peacekeeping Activity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The peacekeeping operations of the United Nations continued to develop in 1993-94. Although the UN Charter still lacks provisions defining the nature of the peacekeeping operations that have been performed by the world community since 1948, the following terminology has been used most often of late:

Peacemaking—activity in the interests of resolving conflicts chiefly through peaceful settlement (mediation, negotiations, various types of assistance), or the preventive deployment of troops to prevent conflict;

Peacekeeping—the separation of the hostile sides, and monitoring the observance of a truce or cease-fire. This is the most widespread type of peacekeeping activity;

Peace enforcement—the taking of more decisive steps using military force, even to the destruction of some armed forces impeding the localization of the conflict and its elimination;

Peacebuilding—measures aimed at restoring the vital activity of the most important elements of the infrastructure and civil institutions of a country during a post-conflict period, using both military and non-military means.

The terms "peacekeeping operations," "operations to ensure peace," and "operations to maintain peace" are also widely employed. They are, as a rule, highly general in nature, and are understood to be one of the four aforementioned types of peacekeeping actions or any combination of them. It should be noted that it is difficult in practice to draw a line between this or that type of UN peacekeeping activity, which is of an integrated, flexible nature and is defined by the specific situation.

The legal foundation developed by the international community to bring order to the employment of the armed forces of the countries engaged in peacekeeping activity has been taking on more and more distinct outlines this year. The conceptual framework for the gradual formation of so-called UN "reserve" forces, which are to be located on their own national territories and prepared for operational deployment to various regions of the world at the request of the secretary general, in order to participate in new or on-going peacekeeping operations. Some 21 countries have announced their readiness to provide "reserve" forces totaling some 30,000 troops so far—Argentina, Bulgaria, Great Britain, Hungary, Guatemala, Denmark, Jordan, Spain, Canada, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Senegal, Syria, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Finland, Chad, the Czech Republic and Sri Lanka. The UN Secretariat is studying technical details with the governments of those countries pertaining to their participation in this type of activity by the community of nations.

The obligations that have been assumed this far, in the estimation of the UN leadership, do not provide to a sufficient extent for all aspects of the peacekeeping efforts of the UN under planned or on-going operations. The lack of resources is still affecting such areas as communications, logistical and engineering support, and troop movements.

Another 27 nations, ten of which are in the stage of final refinement of their official proposals, are expected to assume similar obligations. The size of the UN reserve forces could reach 70,000 troops as a result. A number of countries, on the other hand, are reviewing their national legislation and legal obligations in the interest of making their own military contingents active in the operations of peacekeeping forces.

The fundamental provisions of the military doctrine of the Russian Federation indicate that it "assists the efforts of the world community and various collective-security bodies in averting wars and armed conflicts and maintaining or establishing peace." The "nature, conditions and forms of the participation of Russia in peacekeeping operations undertaken by the UN and other international organizations are defined by the legislation of the RF and by international obligations and agreements, including within the framework of the CIS" therein.

In the spring of 1994, U.S. President Clinton signed a directive that defined the procedure and terms for the use of American servicemen as part of multinational forces. The document emphasizes that the decision to involve American armed forces in peacekeeping operations should be made only when it meets the national interests of the country, the level of command of the

multinational forces is sufficiently effective, and the ultimate aims, stages and tentative time frames for the completion of the operation have been defined.

Charters and other governing documents are being developed in many countries with the aim of raising the level of preparation of personnel for the performance of peacekeeping functions. A number of drawbacks, chiefly in the realm of command and control of the peacekeeping contingents, were revealed in the course of the large-scale and expensive operations to establish and maintain peace in Cambodia, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, forcing the UN leadership to carry out a reorganization of the central structures first of all.

Even though, according to the UN Charter, the key role in planning and conducting operations under the UN flag should belong to the Military Staff Committee (VShK) of the Security Council, the VShK in fact does not take actual part in this work; all of the responsibility is entrusted entirely to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.


It is a part of the UN Secretariat, along with the departments for political, humanitarian and administrative issues, and is headed by a deputy secretary general. The department performs a broad set of tasks associated with operations to maintain or establish peace, render humanitarian assistance, and assist in the conduct of democratic elections and the restoration

of state authorities, as well as other tasks aimed at preserving peace and security in various regions of the globe.

The reorganization of the standard organizational structure of the department, especially for the purpose of developing doctrinal provisions for UN peacekeeping activity and the preparation of reports of the secretary general to the Security Council regarding UN plans for the settlement or localization of regional conflicts, is being envisaged at the recommendation of the secretariat. Two administrations are planned for the future—planning and logistical support (MTO), and operations (see figure)—each of which is to be headed by an assistant secretary general.

The Planning and MTO Administration will provide all-round support for UN operations, as well as the planning of activity and the training of military units and civilian police. It will comprise two departments—planning and logistical support.

The principal area of the work of the administration, according to predictions, will be the day-to-day supervision of peacekeeping activity. It will consist of three regional departments—Europe and Latin America, Asia and the Near East, and Africa. Groups for the military advisor, analysis and evaluation, administration and a situation center (created in September 1993) are planned as individual subdivisions within the



Planned organization of UN department for peacekeeping operations

Key:

- | | |
|------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1. UN Deputy Secretary General | 8. departments |
| 2. Military Advisor Group | 9. Planning |
| 3. Situation Center | 10. Logistical Support |
| 4. Administrative Group | 11. Operations |
| 5. Analysis and Assessment Group | 12. Europe and Latin America |
| 6. administrations | 13. Asia and the Near East |
| 7. Planning and Logistical Support | 14. Africa |

department, directly subordinate to the deputy secretary general for peacekeeping operations.

There are currently 267 people on the staff of the department. Eighty officers from various countries are also working in its structures, although they do not officially belong to it.

The role of the department for peacekeeping operations is growing constantly, taking into account that the UN operations are becoming more and more complex and multifaceted. An increase in its size to 459 people is planned in the near future owing to this. The proposed structural restructuring of the department is aimed, as some foreign military specialists point out, at strengthening the force element of UN peacekeeping activity. The importance of such factors as the appearance of the deeper causes of conflicts, a search for political ways of settling them and the reconciliation of the sides, however, is not being taken into account to the full extent.

The situation center has a special role in organizing the process of command and control of UN operations. A special operation group was formed in April of 1993 to perform continuous observation of operations in the former Yugoslavia. It also began the gathering and processing of information coming from Somalia in June. The group was the foundation for the situation center that was created in the department. It is directly subordinate to the UN deputy secretary general, and is intended for the continuous tracking of the situation in areas where UN operations are being conducted and in other potentially explosive areas. The center gathers and processes information coming from UN missions, other subdivisions and the mass media, and then reports to the leadership of the department and the UN. This is the sole subdivision of the UN secretariat that operates around the clock.

The situation center has groups for administration, watch duty (around the clock), information and research, and program and technical support. A special officer is also responsible for liaison with other subdivisions and the public. There are 27 personnel, including 24 officers or NCOs.

Certain new elements have been discernible over the last two years in the efforts of the world community to settle prevailing conflicts and prevent potential ones.

The UN leadership feels that it is more effective and economically advantageous not to let the clashes between states or various groups within a single country worsen to a critically dangerous level. More and more attention is being devoted to the implementation of preventive measures in this regard. UN forces, for example, were placed in Macedonia at the end of 1992 before armed clashes started among the

opposing sides, making it possible to prevent the spread of the conflict across the whole republic. This task is moreover being performed by an exceedingly small contingent of peacekeeping forces.

A group of UN military observers has been performing international monitoring of the Libyan turnover of a section of disputed territory to Chad since the spring of 1994. Military experts feel that this measure can play a stabilizing role in the further development of relations between the two neighboring countries.

The preventive activity of the UN, however, is not always understood by the parties involved in a conflict. Representatives of the military and civilian authorities in Burundi, for example, are still rejecting a UN proposal to put multinational peacekeeping forces on its territory, even though that could serve as an additional guarantee against a repetition of the Rwandan tragedy.

The collaboration of the United Nations with regional structures is expanding. The UN Charter notes that it "in no way impedes the existence of regional agreements or bodies. Such agreements or bodies and their activity, however, should be compatible with the aims and principles of the organization." The "Security Council should always be fully informed of actions that are being undertaken or are planned within the framework of regional agreements or by regional bodies for the maintenance of international peace and security" therein.

The Security Council adopted a unanimous resolution in July of 1994 that had a high regard for the actions of the CIS forces to maintain peace in Abkhazia, especially the subunits of the Russian peacekeeping forces. That resolution envisages an expansion of the mandate of the UN observer mission in Georgia (MOONNG) and an increase in its size to 136 military observers. Such measures are aimed at coordinating the actions and reinforcing the collaboration between the MOONNG and the CIS peacekeeping forces in accomplishing the corresponding tasks. The CIS peacekeeping forces and the UN military observers should function within the framework of two operations that are independent of each other, each carried out under its own command but in close collaboration. A request has been made to the UN Secretary General to establish a special fund for voluntary contributions from various states to support the realization of the ceasefire agreement. This should facilitate the achievement of the ultimate goal of the operation, the restoration of peace in the region.

Even though the joint efforts of the UN and the NATO countries have as yet failed to achieve peace in the former Yugoslavia, a precedent has nonetheless been created for the use of the armed forces of the latter

(chiefly air and naval forces) in the course of the peacekeeping operation being conducted in that country. The situation that has taken shape there is of an extremely contradictory and tangled nature, as a consequence of which even the threat of harsh military steps against both sides has not produced positive results.

The chairman of the 48th UN General Assembly, S. Insanalli, noted in August 1994 that the community of nations is sometimes not able to cope with the spread of ethnic conflicts, and its actions in a number of cases have not been suited to the prevailing situation. He also expressed anxiety that the boundaries between peacekeeping and more aggressive methods of settlement have been blurred somewhat in some actions, including those in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This, in his opinion, "threatens the reputation of the UN."

Representatives of such regional structures as the Organization of American States (OAS), in conjunction with UN observers, have been monitoring the elections and disarmament of the contras in Nicaragua, and are currently participating in the settlement of the situation in Haiti. The OAS, in the evaluation of foreign military experts, has made an appreciable contribution to the maintenance of peace in Latin America.

The Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the Economic Community of the West African Nations (ECWAN) have been cooperating with the UN in the area of peacekeeping. The OAU intends to send troops from a number of African countries to Rwanda, along with those from other UN member nations. A peacekeeping mission is being carried out in Liberia under the aegis of the ECWAN, in conjunction with a group of UN military observers.

Another new element in the peacekeeping activity of the world community is the fact that in September of 1993 the Security Council, for the first time in the

history of the UN, imposed sanctions not against a nation as a whole, but rather against the UNITA opposition group in Angola.

The contingents of armed forces from various nations are becoming more and more broadly involved in providing humanitarian assistance to the population in conflict zones (the transport and distribution of freight, the guarding of convoys). Essential freight is being delivered, including by parachute drop from military-transport aircraft, in the former Yugoslavia, Somali, the Kurdish regions of Iraq, and Cambodia. It is interesting to note that the United States organizes humanitarian activity in Rwanda according to its own plan, outside the framework of the UN operation. This could become a new form of collaboration for an individual country with the UN in the future.

Ways and methods of increasing the efficiency of the peacekeeping activity of the United Nations are being considered, owing to their expanded scope and increased complexity. An international seminar held in Canada in the spring of 1994 emphasized that the further efforts of the world community would best be directed toward increasing the effectiveness of political leadership and improving the systems of comprehensive support for operations, the command and control of UN contingents and missions, and the development of high-quality and standardized programs for the training of personnel in various categories.

Political scientists and experts, in considering all aspects of the peacekeeping activity of the United Nations as a whole, more and more often emphasize that it should not substitute for the search for ways and means of settling conflicts by political means, but should rather promote an improvement in the situation and the establishment of a dialogue among the opposing parties. The peacekeeping efforts of the world community, in other words, should not be directed just toward "freezing" an explosive situation that could worsen sharply at any moment and lead to new confrontation.

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